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Abstract
The absence of legislation, the lack of a standard cybersecurity framework, and the
failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture can be detrimental to the availability,
confidentiality, and integrity of municipal information systems. The purpose of this
phenomenological study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of municipalities
from the perception of public servants serving in information technology (IT) leadership
roles in highly populated municipalities in the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas
Metropolitan Statistical Area of Puerto Rico. The study was also used to address key
factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of these municipalities. The theoretical
framework was open system theory used in combination with a conceptual framework
encompassing key dimensions influencing digital government. Data were collected using
semistructured interviews with 10 public servants working in IT leadership positions in a
municipal setting in Puerto Rico. Data analysis involved horizontalization, reduction,
elimination, clustering, thematizing, validation, and development of individual and
composite textural descriptions. Participants reported that the cybersecurity posture of
their municipalities was resilient. Participants also reported that technological changes,
politics, the economy, management support, and processes were key elements to achieve
a resilient posture. Findings may be used to empower elected officials, policymakers,
public servants, and practitioners to manage and improve elements affecting
cybersecurity with the goal of achieving a resilient posture to deliver cybersecurity as a
public good.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Information resources have become essential to support the private sector, the
government, and the general population. These entities depend on information systems to
manage data assets and perform the activities required to fulfill their respective business
purposes and mandates. Information systems can be subject to criminal attacks capable of
jeopardizing their functionality, as well as related sensitive data. Hackers are the actors
responsible for executing these attacks. The term hacker was first used to refer to
problem solvers and programmers who were responsible for the development of
automated systems and computer programs (Taylor, Fritsch, Liederbach, & Holt, 2011).
The meaning of hacker has evolved to include cybercriminals such as crackers, script
kiddies, black hats, and hacktivists trying to gain or having gained unauthorized access to
information systems (Kissel, 2013).
The use of technology as a vehicle to commit crimes has become a common threat
(Taylor et al., 2011). The federal government is working to address the challenges and
threats affecting cyberspace. Most federal agencies are incorporating cyber divisions to
protect and defend their information resources. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) of 1986 and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of
2014 are the primary information security policies addressing cyber threats. The CFAA
of 1986 regulates illegal hacking against protected computers, including access without
authorization or exceeding authorized access. Alternatively, FISMA of 2014 mandates
the protection of information technology (IT) infrastructure and services and establishes
“a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security
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controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets” (p. 128).
Under FISMA of 2014, federal agencies and organizations processing federal information
are responsible for implementing security controls in accord with federal “policies,
procedures, standards, and guidelines” (p. 128).
Despite regulations such as CFAA of 1986 and FISMA of 2014, the Internet
remains a “lawless frontier where bullies, deviants, criminals, and terrorists can roam
freely with reckless abandon” (Taylor et al., 2011, p. 2). A comprehensive information
security policy may avoid gaps that could be exploited by cybercriminals. Technology is
constantly evolving, and these changes can affect the ability of policymakers at all
government levels to develop legislation to address the possible impact and consequences
of using new technologies. The CFAA of 1986 covers all government computers, as well
as nongovernment computers, use for “interstate or foreign commerce or
communication” (p. 298). However, FISMA of 2014 is only applicable to entities
responsible for federal information and information systems. This situation created a gap
in policy for the state and local governments, leaving them without a legal obligation and
the absence of a standard framework.
Cyber threats are everybody’s concern. State and local governments have started
to develop and implement information security policies. For instance, the Oficina de
Gerencia y Presupuesto (OGP) de Puerto Rico [Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) of Puerto Rico] established Tecnologías de Información Gubernamental (TIG)
[Government Information Technology] -003: Security of Information Systems Policy to
provide government agencies with guidelines to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
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availability of the information systems and data assets under their jurisdiction. However,
policy-making tends to be reactive to cyber incidents (Bertot, Seifert, & Jaeger, 2015).
This situation could result in legislation that is neither up to date nor comprehensive
enough to address the complexity of cyber threats. The absence of information security
policies and standard frameworks can influence the cybersecurity posture of local
governments and affect the safety of their constituents. Furthermore, the cost of
implementing cybersecurity measures can be expensive for local governments, especially
those in Puerto Rico.
Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States that operates as a
Commonwealth (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2016). Despite the territory status,
Puerto Rico’s government branches, administrative divisions, judiciary system, and
population size resemble those of a state within the United States. Since 2006, Puerto
Rico has been undergoing “a sharper recession than the rest of the United States” (U.S.
Department of Treasury, 2015). Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation is affecting its ability to pay
a public debt of $73 billion (CIA, 2016). This deficit affects Puerto Rico’s ability to
support government operations, including the protection of information systems and data
assets. The purpose of this study was to facilitate understanding of the cybersecurity
postures within government municipalities in Puerto Rico and identify the factors
influencing these postures. Findings may be used to improve the cybersecurity posture of
the local government in Puerto Rico by supporting the security and availability of
government systems through the development and implementation of cost-effective
measures such as legislation, policies, procedures, and collaboration strategies.
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The sections of this chapter introduce the cybersecurity posture of municipalities
within Puerto Rico. These sections include the study’s background, problem, purpose,
and research questions. I also describe the research frameworks that served as the lens to
explore the research problem. This chapter also includes the nature of the study,
definitions of key terms, assumptions, boundaries, limitations, and significance of the
study.
Background of the Study
There is an increasing dependency on information systems, Internet technologies,
and cyberspace. The term technology encompasses “the development and application of
devices for productive processes” (Orrick, 2012, p. 396). These processes are meant to be
beneficial to the common good. Unfortunately, criminals are also benefiting from these
technologies as a vehicle to commit crimes. Government agencies such as municipalities
are taking advantage of technology to facilitate democratic governance, increase citizen
participation, perform daily operations, communicate with constituents, and provide
public services (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Sá, Rocha, & Pérez-Cota, 2015; Saxby,
2015). Municipalities operate the closest to the people and serve as the principal provider
of social and public services such as education, health, and infrastructure management.
Other government duties include performing as first responders and being accountable
for the public safety and emergency management of their jurisdiction (Sylves, 2015). The
use of technology to fulfill these mandates is known as e-government and e-democracy.
The Government of Puerto Rico through the enactment of legislation such as the
Ley de Gobierno Electrónico de 2004 [Electronic Government Act (E-Government Act)
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of 2004] has acknowledged the importance of information resources to promote
economic development, improve the timeliness and quality of government services, and
foster and preserve public trust. The E-Government Act of 2004 mandated agencies to
incorporate IT to conduct government operations and improve their service delivery,
performance, and ability to disclose information, thereby facilitating citizen participation.
However, concerns about cyberattacks affect people’s trust in e-government, especially
within small localities (MacManus, Caruson, & McPhee, 2013). Failing to secure the
technology behind e-government and e-democracy can have an adverse impact on
democracy (Sá et al., 2015; Saxby, 2015). These factors make the cybersecurity posture
of local governments a problem worth studying.
Cybersecurity is a complex concept encompassing many challenges and requiring
numerous strategies to secure the components encompassing cyberspace. These strategies
can include the development, implementation, and management of information security
policies, training, education, security controls, and cross-sector partnerships.
Cyberattacks can have adverse effects on public safety. For this reason, cybersecurity
should be acknowledged as public good within a similar context to public safety (Asllani,
White, & Ettkin, 2013). Asllani et al. (2013) pointed out “the role of federal, state, and
local governments to implement policies and initiatives that improve the cybersecurity of
individuals and organizations” (p. 9). Picazo-Vela, Gutierrez-Martinez, and Luna-Reyes
(2012) recognized the need for developing and implementing information security
policies to deter data compromise, prevent identity theft, and stimulate compliance with
existing regulations. Bertot et al. (2015) agreed on the necessity to address cybersecurity
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threats through policy and technical solutions. However, current policy efforts are
reactionary and have been unable to catch up to emerging threats and technologies
(Bertot et al., 2015).
Public servants at all government levels are responsible for complying with
current policies and implementing adequate security controls. However, most federal
policies have failed to account for the local government and its domain within
cyberspace. This situation could affect the cybersecurity posture of government
municipalities and local operating agencies by leaving them more vulnerable to cyber
threats. In response, the government must be active in addressing policy gaps and
defining adequate security controls to cover the entire echelon of government operations.
Compliance with federal policies like FISMA of 2014 could help develop a
resilient national cybersecurity posture and protect the local government’s operations,
technology investment, mission critical data assets, and other sensitive information.
However, FISMA of 2014 is only applicable to federal agencies and organizations
processing federal information. State and local government voluntary compliance with
federal policy could have a significant impact on the fiscal operations. For instance,
voluntary compliance with information security policy such as FISMA of 2014 involves
expenditures related to addressing system vulnerabilities, developing security safeguards,
implementing security controls, and assessing the cybersecurity posture of the systems.
These requirements can increase operational cost and affect the budget of municipal
agencies.
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According to the U.S. Department of Treasury (2015), “Puerto Rico is deploying
onerous and unsustainable emergency liquidity actions” (p. 3) to continue providing
government services. The fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico has caused the government to
expedite strategies to reduce operational costs. In a continuous attempt to decrease
government spending, the governor of Puerto Rico during 2012 to 2016 issued an Orden
Ejecutiva (OE) [Executive Order] to repeal the Executive Order OE-2009-009 (2009) that
established the office and responsibilities of chief information officer (CIO) of Puerto
Rico. Executive Order No. 2015-019 (2015) dismantled the office of the CIO and
transferred some of the responsibilities into the Departamento de Desarrollo Económico y
Comercio [Department of Economic Development and Commerce] (p. 1). These actions
left Puerto Rico without an IT executive and technical advisor responsible for the
development and implementation of information security policies, strategic plans,
standards, and enterprise architecture.
In the absence of adequate information security policy, local government
personnel, including elected officials, public servants, and IT leaders should have a sense
of duty to look at other information assurance (IA) strategies that may help to protect
their information systems and data assets. However, there is a “significant knowledge
gap” (Caruson, MacManus, & McPhee, 2012, p. 11) between IT professionals and public
administrators. This gap acts as a policy obstacle affecting the planning and
implementation of security controls. According to Caruson et al. (2012), this situation is
one of the reasons why the solution to the existing cybersecurity problem may require
actors external to the government to take action.
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A cybersecurity triad based on collaboration among government levels, the
private sector, and the general population can help mitigate cyber threats. Asllani et al.
(2013) concluded that “cybersecurity requires…federal, state, and local government
organizations; and private organizations and individuals to implement good cybersecurity
controls” (p. 13). A compromise in a municipal system could jeopardize the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of interconnected systems, including systems at
state and federal levels. Cyber awareness, training, and education are critical factors
affecting cyber preparedness. These factors are also crucial for reducing the existing
knowledge gap about cybersecurity (Caruson et al., 2012). Given these factors, the
federal government established the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
(NICE) to be responsible “for cybersecurity awareness, education, training, and
workforce development” (Paulsen, McDuffie, Newhouse, & Toth, 2012, p. 76).
A resilient cybersecurity posture requires the government, the private sector, and
the people to be cognizant of cyber threats, as well as their risks and mitigation strategies.
Asllani et al. (2013) placed the government at the top of the cybersecurity triad. This
position makes public servants, especially those in IT leadership roles, the first line of
defense and increases their need for awareness and education. However, a recent study
revealed a significant knowledge gap among IT professionals and public servants,
especially in the local government (Caruson et al., 2012). Bertot et al. (2015) stressed the
need for education covering cybersecurity risks. Lack of training and awareness can
become bureaucratic roadblocks affecting the implementation of security control
(Caruson et al., 2012). Allowing public servants to attend cybersecurity-related
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conferences and training with the private sector is essential to reduce the existing
knowledge gap and foster public-private collaboration.
The private sector also plays a critical role in the nation’s critical infrastructure,
economy, education, and health. Asllani et al. (2013) explained the importance of publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) such as InfraGard and the Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers. These partnerships facilitate sharing information and devising strategies to
protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from cyber threats. PPPs are crucial to support
the role of the general population within the cybersecurity triad. NICE started working on
cyber awareness and education efforts by partnering with “community centers, school
districts, and colleges and universities around the United States to help run cyber citizen
forums” (Paulsen et al., 2012, p. 78).
Minimal research has been conducted on the local government cybersecurity
posture, especially as it relates to Puerto Rico. Existing studies on cybersecurity have
focused on the private sector and the federal government. This situation has resulted in a
significant gap in knowledge and literature about what local government agencies are
doing to protect themselves against cyber threats and preventing or reacting against
cyberattacks. Cyberspace represents a relatively new domain that policies have not been
able to address with success. It is critical that public servants understand the factors
influencing the cybersecurity posture of their organizations.
Studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities and the factors affecting such
postures was necessary to expand the current cybersecurity knowledge base. Exploring
the posture of municipalities within Puerto Rico may improve understanding of their
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stance and identify influential factors to support the development and implementation of
cost-effective strategies to improve cybersecurity at the local government level. These
strategies include adopting adequate security standards and guidelines, improving
policies and procedures, aligning procurement and acquisition with cybersecurity needs,
developing new cybersecurity and privacy training or taking advantage of other
government agency’s training resources, and implementing partnerships with other
government agencies and the private sector. These strategies may be used to facilitate the
development of a resilient cybersecurity posture in municipalities within Puerto Rico, as
well as other local governments within the United States.
Problem Statement
The absence of legislation, the lack of a standard cybersecurity framework, and
the failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture are detrimental to the availability,
confidentiality, and integrity of information systems. Municipal governments are
benefiting from information systems to perform and manage daily operations. Advances
in technology have also enabled criminals to develop new strategies, expand their
operations, and increase their ability to reach out to more potential victims, including the
government (Taylor et al., 2011). Municipalities are responsible for providing direct
social and public services to their constituency. Furthermore, municipalities serve as
primary responders and are responsible for the public safety and disaster recovery of their
jurisdictions (Sylves, 2015). Cyberattacks against municipalities could be devastating to
their governance, the economy, and the well-being of their constituents.
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Federal, state, and local governments need to manage similar controlled
unclassified information (CUI) to fulfill their mandates. CUI includes personally
identifiable information (PII) of constituents and employees, law enforcement operations,
and information about critical infrastructures, among other sensitive data (U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration, 2018). A compromise on any of these data asset
can affect the government’s reputation, force unnecessary expenditure, undermine
response to emergency events, and disable governance capabilities (Caruson et al., 2012).
At the federal level, FISMA of 2014 provides a framework of security controls to protect
information resources from cyber threats. However, state and local governments are not
subject to federal information security policies such as FISMA of 2014. In the same way
as FISMA of 2014, other federal mandates like circulars from the OMB and several
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) do not require compliance by these
entities.
Caruson et al. (2012) affirmed that there has been minimal research on the
cybersecurity posture of local governments and the ability of public servants to manage
and implement security controls to mitigate cyber threats. Recent studies on cybersecurity
have concentrated on the federal government, leaving a gap in knowledge about this
phenomenon at the local level. The cost to voluntarily comply with federal information
security policy can affect the operational cost of local governments. Understanding the
cybersecurity posture of municipal governments may assist in developing cost-effective
strategies to improve the resiliency of the cybersecurity posture of these organizations.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of
municipalities from the perception of public servants serving in IT leadership roles in
Puerto Rico. The study also addressed the primary factors influencing the cybersecurity
posture of municipal governments in Puerto Rico. A phenomenological approach was
used to address the knowledge gap about the problem. This qualitative study focused on
the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases. In this study, cybersecurity
posture was defined as the security status of the municipal “networks, information, and
systems based on IA resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies) and
capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation
changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179).
Research Questions
Two qualitative research questions (RQs) guided the study. These questions were
designed to address the lived experiences of IT leaders regarding the phenomenon under
study. The research questions for this study were the following:
RQ1: How do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive the cybersecurity
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico?
RQ2: What factors do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive as most
influential to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture in government municipalities in
Puerto Rico?

13
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework for the study was the open system theory (OST). This
theory originated from the general system theory (GST). Bertalanffy (as cited in Sher,
2004) argued that “studying the smallest elements of phenomena was disadvantageous
because that way one lost sight of the whole” (p. 613). Therefore, Bertalanffy (as cited in
Sher, 2004) proposed a multidisciplinary approach incorporating theories and concepts
from different disciplines to study phenomena as a whole. According to Sher (2004),
Bertalanffy’s GST emphasizes the arrangements, functions, and relationships of the
elements of a system or phenomena. GST has been applied to system engineering,
cybernetics, information systems, and social sciences (Bailey, 2005).
The concept of cybersecurity involves most of these areas of study, especially
information systems and social sciences. Shafritz, Ott, and Jang (2015) explained that
these elements are interconnected and may include “inputs, processes, outputs, and
feedback loops, and the environment” (p. 340). OST was relevant to this study because
the cybersecurity posture of local government municipalities can be divided into
empirical units. These entities include personnel, processes, and technologies. As
proposed in OST, changes in one element have positive or adverse effects on other
system components affecting the level of resiliency of the cybersecurity posture.
Studying cybersecurity as an open system was intended to identify which elements are
influencing the security posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico and to explain their
relationships.
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Conceptual Framework
Cybersecurity consists of multiple realities, particularly when studied from the
perspectives of individuals. The conceptual framework was based on the Picazo-Vela et
al.’s (2012) key dimensions influencing digital government. This framework consists of
six dimensions, including “(1) general context, (2) institutional framework, (3)
interorganizational collaboration and networks, (4) organizational structures and
processes, (5) information and data, and (6) technology” (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p.
506). Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the dimensions influencing digital
government.

Figure 1. Dimensions influencing digital government. Adapted from “Understanding Risks,
Benefits, and Strategic Alternatives of Social Media Applications in the Public Sector,” by S.
Picazo-Vela, I. Gutierrez-Martinez, and L. F. Luna-Reyes, 2012, Government Information
Quarterly 29(4), p. 507.

The dimensions in the Picazo-Vela et al.’s (2012) framework were used to capture
the complexity of the cybersecurity phenomenon. These interrelated dimensions
contributed to the structure of the literature review, the development of interview
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questions, the organization of the collected data, and the data analysis and interpretation.
The dimensions also provided the lens to identify which elements are influencing the
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was qualitative. I used a transcendental
phenomenological design to study the cybersecurity posture of municipalities as a social
problem. Most security artifacts are protected from public release by privacy laws like the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by Exception 2 (b). However, individuals such as IT
leaders provided trustworthy and dependable alternative data sources that were used to
study the cybersecurity posture of municipal governments.
Phenomenology focuses on the experience of the participants. The current gap in
knowledge and the limitations of privacy regulations made phenomenology a suitable
approach to study cybersecurity. These conditions supported the rationale for using a
phenomenological approach for performing the collection and analysis of data grounded
in participants’ experiences. The phenomenon investigated was the perception of public
servants in IT leadership roles regarding the cybersecurity posture of municipalities
within Puerto Rico and the factors influencing this posture. The perceptions of
participants originated from their lived experiences with different cybersecurity concepts.
The key inquiries of the study were related to the ability of municipalities to
protect the information resources under their jurisdiction from cyber threats and
cyberattacks. The methodology included face-to-face interviews with individuals as the
unit of analysis. The sample consisted of public servants working as IT leaders who had
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experienced the phenomenon. A strategy incorporating purposeful and criterion sampling
was used to identify 10 participants who served as information-rich cases. The
semistructured interview protocol included 13 open-ended questions.
The data obtained from the interviews were captured through a combination of
field notes, mind maps, and audio recording. Data were organized using NVivo
qualitative data analysis software. This software supported the coding, analysis,
interpretation, and representation of the data. The data were analyzed through a
combination of predetermined and emerging codes. Predetermined codes originated from
the conceptual framework. Emerging codes were discovered as part of the data analysis.
This methodology was used to describe the cybersecurity posture of municipalities and
identify the factors that had the most significant influence on the phenomenon.
Definitions
Scholars agree on the need for concise definitions of the concepts related to the
cybersecurity (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, & Purse, 2014; Kenney, 2015; Tehrani, Manap,
& Taji, 2013). Scholars, industries, organizations, and countries adhere to distinct
definitions of cybersecurity concepts. Craigen et al. (2014) argued that not having a
consistent meaning for these concepts could affect the development of solutions capable
of addressing the complexity of cybersecurity. To provide uniform, concise, and reliable
definitions, the Glossary of Key Information Security Terms was the primary source for
defining the concepts related to the study. This glossary was developed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in alignment with the Committee for
National Security Systems.
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Agency: Government entities of the executive branch of the government, public
corporations, municipalities and legislatures, special corporations for municipal
development, municipal corporations, boards and those entities under the jurisdiction of
this branch (Ethics in Government Act, 2011).
Attacker/hacker: An unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an
information system (Kissel, 2013).
Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorized entity (Kissel, 2013).
Compromise: Disclosure of information to unauthorized persons, or a violation of
the security policy of a system in which unauthorized intentional or unintentional
disclosure, modification, destruction, or loss of an object may have occurred (Kissel,
2013).
Confidentiality: The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes (Kissel, 2013).
Controlled unclassified information (CUI): Unclassified information (a) pertinent
to the national interests of the United States or the important interests of entities outside
the federal government, and (b) under law or policy requires protection from
unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits (Kissel, 2013).
Critical infrastructure: System and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have
a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters (Kissel, 2013).
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Cyber incident: Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in
an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and the information
residing therein (Kissel, 2013).
Cyberattack: Attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace
for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a
computing environment/infrastructure, or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing
controlled information (Kissel, 2013).
Cybersecurity: The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from
cyberattacks (Kissel, 2013).
Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of
the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers (Kissel, 2013).
Data asset: A system or application output file, database, document, Web page,
and service that may be provided to access data from an application (Kissel, 2013).
Information assurance (IA): Measures that protect and defend information and
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities
(Kissel, 2013).
Information resources: Information and related resources, such as personnel,
equipment, funds, and IT (Kissel, 2013).
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Information security policy: Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and
practices that prescribe how an organization manages, protects, and distributes
information (Kissel, 2013).
Information sharing: Requirements for information sharing by an IT system with
one or more other IT systems or applications, for information sharing to support multiple
internal or external organizations, missions, or public programs (Kissel, 2013).
Information system: A discrete set of information resources organized for the
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of
information (Kissel, 2013).
Information technology (IT): Any equipment or interconnected system or
subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information (Kissel, 2013).
Integrity: The property that sensitive data have not been modified or deleted in an
unauthorized and undetected manner (Kissel, 2013).
IT leaders: Individuals responsible for the IA of a program, organization, system,
or enclave (Kissel, 2013).
Personally identifiable information (PII): Any information about an individual
maintained by an agency, including (a) any information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of
birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (b) any other information that is
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linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and
employment information (Kissel, 2013).
Public servant: Person in the government involved in the formulation and
implementation of public policy or not, but performs as permanent or temporary, with or
without pay. It also includes the contractor whose contract is equivalent to a position or
responsibilities related to public policy (Ethics in Government Act, 2011).
Resilience: The ability to quickly adapt and recover from any known or unknown
changes to the environment through the holistic implementation of risk management,
contingency, and continuity planning (Kissel, 2013).
Security controls: The management, operational, and technical safeguards or
countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the system and its information (Kissel, 2013).
Security posture: Status of an enterprise’s networks, information, and systems
based on IA resources and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise
and to react as the situation changes (Kissel, 2013).
Security program plan: A formal document that provides an overview of the
security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and
describes the program management security controls and common security controls in
place or planned for meeting those requirements (Kissel, 2013).
Sensitive information: Information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or
modification of, that could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal
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programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a
(Kissel, 2013).
Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation),
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the nation through an
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, or denial of service (Kissel, 2013).
Vulnerability: Weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat
source (Kissel, 2013).
Assumptions
Several assumptions were critical to the methodology, particularly the sampling
strategy. The assumptions were related to the trustworthiness of the data, the selection of
research sites, and the population sample. The unit of analysis consisted of IT leaders as
individual entities. Privacy regulations protected against the disclosure or public release
of cybersecurity documents. I assumed that the IT leaders would provide trustworthy and
dependable data. Information security policies prevent organizations from sharing
cybersecurity-related information.
The sites for the study included municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina –
Caguas Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as defined by the OMB Bulletin 13-01. The
plan to target these municipalities emerged from the assumption that highly populated
municipalities manage larger budgets, provide additional services, and require more
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complex information resources than less populated municipalities. Highly populated
municipalities need additional resources to support and sustain the continuity of their
government operations for a larger population. This assumption justified considering
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA for the study.
The conditions within highly populated municipalities had an influence on the
selection of IT leaders for the study. Government agencies with additional functions,
resources, and complex information systems enhanced the lived experiences of IT leaders
working within these environments. The exposure of the participants to these conditions
supported their inclusion as information-rich cases for the study. This assumption
supported the use of purposeful and criterion sampling to identify participants that could
serve as information-rich cases. Finally, I assumed that participants would be available to
participate in interviews and provide member checking.
Scope and Delimitations
The purpose of the study was to explore the cybersecurity posture of
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. This posture was related to
the local government position to protect and defend information systems and data assets
through the management of information resources and security policies. The purpose also
included the analysis of the factors that may be influencing the administration of
information resources and security controls. This focus was chosen to address the
knowledge gap about the phenomenon, to develop strategies to support the local
government’s cybersecurity resilience, and to identify areas for future research.
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Delimitation consists of determining the limits or boundaries for the research
(New Oxford American Dictionary, n.d.). Patton (2002) described delimitation as a
process to eliminate “irrelevant, repetitive, or overlapping data” (Phenomenological
Analysis, para. 6) to focus on the data that are more relevant for the study. The study was
delimited to the population of public servants acting in IT leadership roles within the San
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. The Government of Puerto Rico defines public servant
as any person working within the government, including permanent, temporary,
contracted, and without pay employee (Ethics in Government Act, 2011). This
delimitation excluded participants from less populated municipalities that did not provide
the conditions to support the development of IT leaders as information-rich cases.
The theoretical foundation for the study was limited to the OST and the
dimensions influencing digital government (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Other related
frameworks were excluded for not been relevant to the nature of the problem. For
example, the complex adaptive systems framework addresses the behaviors of known
agents within a system. These behaviors include “emergence, stability or chaos,
adaptation, and attraction” (Morrell, 2005, p. 72). On the other hand, OST was designed
to identify system components and examine their relationship.
The outcomes of this study may contribute to the improvement of cybersecurity
resilience of government and nongovernmental organizations in and outside of Puerto
Rico. However, the scope and delimitations of the study did not provide for a direct
transferability of the results. Puerto Rico’s governmental structure resembles that of a
U.S. state. Puerto Rico is a commonwealth with an executive, legislative, and judiciary
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branch. Similar to U.S. states, Puerto Rico’s administrative division includes a state
government with an elected governor and jurisdictions or districts known as
municipalities, each with an elected mayor. Also, the legal system in Puerto Rico consists
of civil law within the context of the federal system (CIA, 2016). According to the U.S.
Census Bureau (2015b), Puerto Rico ranks 30 in population size among the 50 states and
territories with a total of 3,474,182 people. This similarity supported the transferability of
the research methodology and design to study other local governments within the United
States.
Limitations
The dependability of the data was crucial to the quality and significance of the
study. The primary data source consisted of interviews with public servants in IT
leadership roles to obtain their perceptions of the cybersecurity posture of the
municipalities, as well as the factors influencing the perceived posture. Participants who
lacked such experiences with cybersecurity at the local government could have affected
the dependability of the data. Criterion sampling takes into consideration cases meeting a
“predetermined criterion of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). The
criteria included at least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon as a senior IT
professional. These conditions were essential to support the relevance of the data.
The availability of the participants limited the scope of the study. The interviews
were planned to take place in 2017. In some municipalities, this was the first year of the
new administration after the 2016 election. These municipalities could have been waiting
to appoint their IT leadership, or the appointed executives may have been working on
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projects that may have affected their availability to participate. Reasonable measures to
address this limitation included the identification of additional municipalities and
participants within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA as candidates for the study.
However, a Category 5 hurricane struck the island, leaving most of the population
without electricity and water. The local government was actively engaged in disaster
response and recovery. The interviews were performed in May 2018. External threats
such as the lack of literature relating to cybersecurity at the local government level also
presented a limitation. However, literature about the federal and state levels was
examined in the literature review.
Significance of the Study
Significance to Practice
Understanding the cybersecurity posture of municipalities supported advances in
practice and policy. The results helped to provide knowledge, identify skills, and promote
attitudes to benefit IT leaders and policymakers on achieving a resilient cybersecurity
posture. The study addressed the factors influencing such postures. Identifying and
understanding these factors was crucial to provide comprehensive research-based
solutions to improve the administration of information security programs and policies.
Significance to Theory
Studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities resulted in a significant
contribution to the discipline of public policy and administration. Cyberattacks can
jeopardize government operations, the economy, and the well-being of constituents.
These risks can cause social and economic injustice to individuals and communities
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within the affected jurisdiction. The knowledge gap about this phenomenon represented a
challenge to scholars in the discipline. Contributing to the body of knowledge provided
better understanding and served as the foundation for future investigations targeting areas
of relevance to cybersecurity at the municipal level.
Significance to Social Change
The outcomes of this study contributed to positive social change by empowering
elected officials, public servants, IT leaders, and community members with knowledge
about why it is essential to secure information systems and how to identify resources and
policies to support cybersecurity. Also, public servants and IT leaders could develop
skills to reassign resources, implement policies, and establish procedures to protect
information systems and data assets from cyberattacks. Further, community members
may become aware of cyber threats and assume an active role in supporting the
government in the implementation of measures to improve their cybersecurity posture.
These results may improve the resiliency of cybersecurity at the local, national, and
international government levels.
Summary and Transition
Information resources are used to facilitate day-to-day tasks for the government,
the private sector, and the people. Technology has also provided the opportunity to
digitalize traditional criminal behavior (Taylor et al., 2011). Criminals have been able to
improve their illegal operations, develop new illicit strategies, and expand their target to
include the government. According to Caruson et al. (2012), cyberattacks can distress the
government’s reputation, expenditure, and governance.
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Internet technologies and cyberspace are relatively new areas for which policy has
not been able to become accustomed. Also, technology and its uses are constantly
evolving, which further impairs policy efforts to address cyber threats. The federal
government has enacted information security policies, including legislation, circulars, and
directives, to provide a standard security framework and controls to protect information
resources. However, most of these policies have been focused on the federal government,
and compliance has not been required for state or local governments. This circumstance
generated a policy gap that fails to address cybersecurity at the local government level.
This qualitative study addressed the security posture of municipalities within
Puerto Rico. Additionally, the study addressed the factors influencing the cybersecurity
posture of these organizations. The study targeted highly populated municipalities within
the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA to explore a population with more experience
with the phenomenon. Reducing the knowledge gap on the cybersecurity posture of
municipalities may contribute to the development and implementation of cost-effective
strategies and safeguards to mitigate cyber threats. In Chapter 2, I review the literature
related to the study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The use of technologies such as computers, cloud services, e-mail, and social
media facilitates the daily living of individual, private sector, and government entities.
Technology has also increased the exposure of these entities to cyber threats. Tehrani et
al. (2013) agreed that advances in technology are beneficial to society, but also useful for
criminals and terrorist. These actors are taking advantage of technology to commit illicit
activities from cyberspace. Furthermore, illicit activities such as cyberattacks can be
executed from anywhere in the world against any target, including the government
(Tehrani et al., 2013).
The problem addressed in the study was the absence of legislation, the lack of a
standard security framework, and the failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture.
These conditions can be detrimental to the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of
local government systems. Municipalities are taking advantage of information systems to
manage their operations and deliver public services. Further, municipal agencies are
responsible for providing direct social and public services to their constituents. According
to Sylves (2015), local governments are primary responders with responsibilities for the
public safety and disaster recovery of their jurisdictions. Cyberattacks against municipal
systems can have negative consequences on local governance, public services, public
safety, and the economy.
Cybersecurity represents a significant challenge in the preservation of national
security, public safety, and the economy (Chen & Dongre, 2014; Roesener, Bottolfson, &
Fernandez, 2014). Furthermore, the increasing social dependency on information systems
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and new technologies is causing an upsurge of cyber threats and systems vulnerabilities,
including severity and the frequency of cyberattacks (Kazemi, Khajouei, & Nasrabadi,
2012). Lozowski (2015) discussed the results of a recent survey, which included 678
participants from the United States. Lozowski explained that about 75% of participants
agreed that the severity of cyberattacks has increased. Similarly, 68% agreed that
cyberattacks have increased in frequency (Lozowski, 2015). These conditions make
adopting a resilient cybersecurity posture imperative for individuals and organizations.
Critical infrastructures such as power grid, mass transit, and financial systems are
at risk of sophisticated cyberattacks capable of affecting lives and the economy (Roesener
et al., 2014). The U.S. government understood the continuing growth of cyber threats
against critical infrastructure and recognized it as one of the most serious security
challenges that could affect national and economic security (Executive Order No. 13,636,
2013). In response to the threats to critical infrastructure, the federal government enacted
Executive Order 13,636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013) and the
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
(2013). These policies appoint federal agencies as the responsible parties for identifying
and helping secure critical infrastructure (Executive Office of the President, 2013).
State and local governments sometimes in partnership with the private sector are
responsible for managing utilities, communication, transit, and financial systems.
Cyberattacks against municipal infrastructures can affect hospitals, businesses, and
government facilities. Moreover, attacks against transit systems can disturb timely,
affordable, and necessary access to health, education, businesses, and government
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services (Fok, 2015). Municipalities also depend on financial systems to manage payroll
and administer government operations such as taxation and public services for their
jurisdiction. Financial systems contain CUI, including PII. Taylor et al. (2011) affirmed
that cybercrimes such as “identity theft and Internet fraud are constantly rising” (p. 2).
Cyberattacks against municipal systems can affect the availability to meet their mandates
and preserve the confidentiality of the data assets that could be used to commit identity
theft and fraud.
Executive Order 13,636 (2013) and PPD-21 (2013) identify state and local
governments as critical infrastructure owners and define their roles as collaborators.
However, federal information security policies are not necessarily applicable to
nonfederal entities. Furthermore, these policies provide a set of voluntary security
frameworks and controls. For instance, Executive Order 13,636 (2013) requires the
establishment of a voluntary program supporting “the adoption of the Cybersecurity
Framework by owners and operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested
entities” (Sec. 8). However, the voluntary adoption of these security frameworks and
controls represent an additional level of effort that could impact operating costs.
Governments without the appropriate budgetary resources or those undergoing fiscal
crisis such as Puerto Rico may not be able to adopt these requirements.
The next sections of this chapter include the literature search strategy, theoretical
and conceptual foundations, and the literature review. The literature search strategy
includes the list of databases, search engines, terms, and conditions used to identify
relevant literature. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks cover the previous
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application, rationale, and relation to the OST and the dimensions influencing digital
government to the study of the cybersecurity posture of local governments in Puerto
Rico. The chapter also includes a review of the current literature related to the concepts
and elements of cybersecurity. The chapter concludes with a summary of key themes and
findings from the literature review.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature search strategy consisted of a combination of scholarly databases,
government websites, search engines, and books. A total of four scholarly databases,
including LexisNexis, ProQuest Central, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses @ Walden
University, and Science Direct were used in the literature search process. In addition to the
scholarly databases, government websites from the U.S. federal government and Puerto
Rico were used to search for literature. U.S. federal government websites included U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Census Bureau, OMB, CIA, and the Executive
Office of the President. Government websites for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
included Departamento de Estado de Puerto Rico [Puerto Rico Department of State],
Oficina del Contralor de Puerto Rico [Office of the Comptroller of Puerto Rico], OGP,
and Portal Oficial del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico [Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico Official Government Web Portal]. Google was the primary search engine used
throughout the literature search process to navigate websites and search for terms.
The terms used in the literature search included information technology,
information system, cybersecurity, cyber security, information security, local
government, and United States. Other terms, including information assurance and Puerto
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Rico, were used in ad hoc searches with no relevant results. Depending on the query
capabilities of the database, website, and search engine, these terms were combined using
the AND search operator and the OR search operator. The main combination of terms
contained cybersecurity, cyber security, and information security.
The iterative search process included ad hoc searches for each term and analysis
of the outcomes. Based on the analysis of the results, the search terms were combined,
and additional criteria were added. The combination of terms returning the most relevant
results was cybersecurity OR cyber security OR information security AND local
government AND United States. Additional criteria, including limitation to only full text,
peer-reviewed, and publication date, were used to ensure accessible, trustworthy, and
relevant results. These conditions were applied to searches in ProQuest and Science
Direct.
There was limited research about cybersecurity at the state and local government
level. All searches returned many articles related to cybersecurity. However, the articles
were not directly related to the phenomenon, especially not at the local or municipal
level. Independent of the efforts to limit the results to local and municipal governments,
the outcomes were relevant to national and international levels. Several strategies were
used to compensate for the shortage of literature about the phenomenon at the local
government level. First, the search outcomes were limited to literature related to a
national level and below with priority for both state and local governments. Further,
websites from the U.S. federal government and Puerto Rico were searched for laws,

33
policies, and guidance related to cybersecurity and related concepts. Also, Lexis Nexis
was used to search for laws enacted by the government of Puerto Rico.
Theoretical Foundation
The concept of cybersecurity posture was the phenomenon investigated,
especially as it related to government municipalities. NIST explained the concept of
security posture as the stance of an organization’s information resources “based on IA
resources and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as
the situation changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179). This definition made cybersecurity posture
a multidimensional concept involving aspects such as people, technology, policies,
processes, and organizational elements.
Organizations can be studied and described within the context of an open system
(Burke, 2011). Municipalities are organizations that, like open systems, are contingent to
the dynamic interaction of internal and external dimensions within their environment.
These interactions made OST a suitable theoretical framework for the study. OST
emerged from GST. Based on the GST, scholars such as Von Bertalanffy, Katz, and
Kahn outlined 10 distinctive characteristics present within open systems (Burke, 2011).
These characteristics include the importation of energy, throughput, output, cycles of
events, negative entropy, negative feedback, steady-state, differentiation, integration and
coordination, and equifinality (Burke, 2011).
The major theoretical proposition was that organizations need an energy source to
generate the product and services related to their business purpose and required for their
survival. This energy comes from their environment in the form of “money, raw
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materials, or the work of people” (Burke, 2011, p. 56). The energy goes through different
events as the throughput to produce outputs in the form of product or services. These
events are considered cyclical. During these cycles, organizations are subject to entropy
that could affect their existence (Burke, 2011).
Feedback from the environment can be used to develop courses of action to
support the stability of the organization. After achieving a level of stability, the
organization can enter a process of differentiation focused on the growth and
specialization of operations (Burke, 2011). This process goes hand and hand with the
need to integrate and coordinate among the different organizational and environmental
elements. Lastly, the concept of equifinality relates to the flexibility to achieve the same
goal from different courses of action (Burke, 2011).
In the case of cybersecurity, municipalities need energy to manage the events
supporting the implementation and maintenance of security controls. These controls help
to safeguard the municipalities from cyber threats and deliver cybersecurity as a service.
The processes and the events related to the security controls are cyclical. Further,
municipalities experiencing loss of energy such as budget cuts, personnel reduction, and
other events affected by negative entropy that could result in successful cyber incidents.
For this reason, the use of information and feedback is critical to developing courses of
action capable of improving the cybersecurity posture of the municipalities. A resilient
cybersecurity posture could facilitate reaching a steady-state that allows the
municipalities to work on differentiation and coordination strategies. Lastly, the principle
equifinality gives municipal IT leaders the opportunity to take the appropriate paths to
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achieve a more desirable posture.
According to Bailey (2005), the GST has been used to study phenomena related to
information systems and social sciences. Further, OST has been used to investigate
organizations and information system management (Burke, 2011). Johnson (2012) used
systems engineering as an application of the system theory to analyze federal governance
practices for protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks. According to Johnson,
using systems engineering to study cyber terrorism provided the ability to concentrate on
different elements related to the environment, the market, and the people. Understanding
the different elements related to cyber terrorism can help to develop controls to protect
critical infrastructure. Johnson affirmed that the system theory could facilitate the
understanding of cyber terrorism as a system and support the process to sustain or
improve the posture of critical infrastructure.
Baker (2013) used a conceptual framework based on the GST to study the
phenomenon of information sharing among public safety agencies. Baker described these
agencies as open systems interacting with each other. As proposed in the GST, changes in
one element can affect other interrelated elements and the system as a whole. This
principle is also true for public agencies where changes in any aspect of the organization
“can affect the entire organizational system” (Baker, 2013, p. 16).
This research concentrated on studying municipalities as organizations and their
cybersecurity postures as part of their IT management from a perspective of public policy
and public administration which relates to the field of social sciences. Organizations such
as municipalities encompassed interconnected elements, including “inputs, processes,
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outputs, and feedback loops, and the environment” (Shafritz et al., 2015, p. 340). Also,
their cybersecurity posture can be divided into interconnected elements. The OST
proposed that changes in one element can affect other interconnected system components.
Therefore, changes in one element can have positive or adverse effects on the resiliency
level of the cybersecurity posture. These conditions support the rationale for choosing
OST as the theoretical foundation for the study.
Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) agreed that IT-related phenomena are
multidimensional and encompass factors beyond “technological complexity” (p. 188).
Gil-Garcia and Pardo recognized that irrespective of the diversity of challenges affecting
IT projects, “notable consistencies exist across the disciplines” (p. 188). Gil-Garcia,
Pardo, and Baker (2007) emphasized the importance of understanding the organizational
and social factors influencing the IT phenomenon. Further, Gil-Garcia et al. recognized
systems theory as an approach capable of providing a holistic view of IT phenomenon.
Therefore, studying cybersecurity as an open system served as the theoretical lens to
identify and explain the relationship of the elements influencing the security posture of
government municipalities in Puerto Rico. The OST encompassed characteristics related
to the internal and external dimensions of the organization, including their people,
interorganizational collaboration, structures, processes, and technology.
Conceptual Framework
Previous IT-related research shared the need for a framework capable of capturing
multidimensional elements. According to Jiang and Klein (2000), researchers agreed
“that system success is a multidimensional concept” (p. 4). Jiang and Klein were two of
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the primary researchers contributing to the conceptual framework that was used during
this study. Jiang and Klein employed surveys to study risks affecting IT project
performance, especially as it related to software development. A crucial part of the
research was to identify common project risks. Jiang and Klein discovered that the
absence of expertise and clear roles had a substantial impact on project effectiveness. GilGarcia et al. (2007) explained that “recognizing the importance of multiple factors for a
more comprehensive view of the phenomenon is not unique to systems development and
extends to information systems research in general” (p. 4).
Based on the multidimensional aspect of IT and organizational phenomena,
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a framework that was used as the scholarly
framework for this research. For this study, the framework was referenced as the
dimensions influencing digital government. The framework consists of six dimensions
starting with a general context covering the environmental features surrounding the
phenomenon. In the case of cybersecurity posture, this element included “economic,
political, and social” (p. 507) characteristics affecting the municipal cybersecurity
posture. On the other hand, the institutional framework consisted of policies such as
“laws, regulations, norms or any other rule” influencing the cybersecurity posture of
government municipalities. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) described this dimension as
complex and crucial as it defines the legal environment influencing governmental action.
The interorganizational collaboration dimension encompasses the development
and sustainment of partnerships with parties who could contribute to advances related to
the phenomenon. According to Picazo-Vela et al. (2012), the use of professional
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networks, including nonprofit and private organizations can facilitate problem-solving
and achieve better solutions. The level of collaboration and networking with other
organizations could have a significant impact on the cybersecurity posture of
municipalities. On the contrary, organizational structures and processes consist of the
internal structure, procedures, and strategic planning of a given organization. Picazo-Vela
et al. stated that these elements could directly affect the performance of the organization.
For instance, the centralization or decentralization of cybersecurity-related tasks could
influence the posture of the organization. Similarly, technical, operational, and
administrative procedures could have a positive impact on the municipal posture.
Information is another essential dimension of the conceptual framework. PicazoVela et al. (2012) stressed that “lack of high-quality data or information may cause
project delays or even failure” (p. 507). In cybersecurity, not having information on how
to safeguard information resources and data assets could result in a cyber incident or
compromise. The last dimension encompassed “hardware, software, and infrastructure
technologies” (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p. 507). Access to the appropriate technology
and the ability to implement it properly are crucial to supporting a resilient cybersecurity
posture. Also, the use of incompatible and untested technologies is a potential source of
problems and security challenges (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012).
Related conceptual frameworks have been applied in previous studies to
investigate phenomena like cybersecurity. Jiang and Klein (2000) formulated a summary
of project management risks based on contemporary literature to examine the effect of
the risks on the distinct phases of system development. Understanding these risks and
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their impacts can contribute to the development and adoption of controls to mitigate risks
and improve IT project performance. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) used this study as the
foundation for the development of a conceptual framework to capture the factors
affecting government IT initiatives. The research was aimed at the federal government
but recognized the importance of developing strategies to advance IT initiatives at the
state and local government level. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) categorized key factors
affecting government IT initiatives into five groups, including “(1) information and data,
(2) information technology, (3) organizational and managerial, (4) legal and regulatory,
and (5) institutional and environmental” (p. 190).
A few years later, Gil-Garcia et al. (2007) used this framework to investigate “the
use of comprehensive prototyping” (p. 2) as a method for understanding emerging
technologies. The factors affecting government IT initiatives provided the framework to
support the understanding of organizational and social elements affecting systems
development. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a 6-layer framework based on the GilGarcia and Pardo’s framework to identify the risks and benefits of social media as a
government IT initiative. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a more comprehensive
framework that consolidated legal and regulatory factors within an institutional
framework, separated environmental factors into a different dimension, and added a layer
to account for technology. Figure 2 shows a side by side comparison of the frameworks.
The concepts applied by Jiang and Klein (2000), Gil-Garcia et al. (2007), and
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) proved beneficial for studying phenomena related to IT
management from a multidimensional perspective. Furthermore, Gil-Garcia et al. (2007)
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and Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) used these concepts to gain an understanding of the factors
affecting the management of IT initiatives and new technologies within the government.
Cybersecurity is a critical multidimensional discipline within IT. The modification made
by Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) gave the framework the complexity to capture the essence of
the cybersecurity phenomenon, especially as it relates to the local government. The
dimensions influencing digital government framework was beneficial to the formulation
of interview questions, as well as to the collection, organization, analysis, and
interpretation of research data, and literature.
Dimensions Influencing Digital Government

Factor Affecting Government IT Initiatives

Figure 2. Comparison of conceptual frameworks influencing digital government. Adapted
from "Understanding Context through a Comprehensive Prototyping,” by J. R. Gil-Garcia, T.
Pardo, & A. Baker, 2007, Proceedings from HICSS ‘07: Experience: A Testbed Research
Strategy for Emerging Technologies.

Literature Review
NIST defines cybersecurity as “the ability to protect or defend the use of
cyberspace from cyberattacks” (Kissel, 2013, p. 58). Like NIST, there are many other
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definitions of cybersecurity. Unfortunately, the absence of a uniform definition can be an
obstacle for interdisciplinary advances and solutions for addressing the complexity of
cybersecurity. For these reasons, Craigen et al. (2014) took into consideration some of the
most commonly accepted definitions of cybersecurity to develop a comprehensive
interpretation. Craigen et al. (2014) defined the concept of cybersecurity as “organization
and collection of resources, processes, and structures used to protect cyberspace and
cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign de jure from de facto
property rights” (Craigen et al., 2014, p. 17). The elements in the dimensions influencing
digital government are aligned with this definition of cybersecurity. For this reason, the
dimensions of the framework were used to structure the literature review. Most of the
articles reviewed utilized qualitative methodology, literature review, and secondary data.
General Context Influence on Cybersecurity
According to Picazo-Vela et al. (2012), general context incorporates economic,
political and social environmental factors. Achieving a common understanding of
cybersecurity-related concepts is an important component of the general context
dimension. Kenney (2014) performed a literature review to explore the differences
between cybersecurity-related concepts such as cyberattacks, cyberwarfare, hacktivism,
and cyberterrorism. According to Kenney (2014), these concepts share many similarities
making it difficult to differentiate among them. Under these concepts, the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information systems are attacked using similar strategies,
while external attributes may be different.
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External attributes. Kadivar (2014) performed a literature review and used
expert advice to identify common attributes across the definitions of cyberattacks. In the
study, five attributes constituting cybersecurity were identified, including actors, assets,
motivation, effects, and duration. Fok (2015) also used literature review and identified
similar attributes affecting cybersecurity. According to Fok (2015), actors include
individuals, organized groups, and nation states. The first group includes hackers,
amateurs, script kiddies, and people with technical skills looking for “fun or notoriety”
(Fok, 2015, p. 33). The second groups mixed insider threats and organized groups like
criminal organizations and hacktivist. The third group includes “terrorist and nation states
engaged in cyber warfare” (Fok, 2015, p. 33).
According to a recent report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(2017), Russia as a nation-state performed a cyber intrusion on multiple state and local
electoral boards systems. Other potential targets consist of different information systems
and data assets, including critical infrastructure. Miron and Muita (2014) used a literature
review to study cybersecurity capability maturity models relevant to improving the
security posture of critical infrastructure providers. Critical infrastructures are “assets or
systems required for the security and well-being of citizens” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p.
33). These systems support and provide “energy, transportation, telecommunication,
water supply and waste management, agriculture and food supply, finance, public health,
and essential government services” (Hua & Bapna, 2013, p. 175). On the other hand,
motivations can consist of individual beliefs or shared ideals that could be influenced by
economic, political, and social factors. The effects of a cyberattack can include
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“alteration, deletion, corruption, deception, degradation, disablement, disruption, or
destruction of assets” (Kadivar, 2014, p. 23).
Economic. According to Kadivar (2014), the government, the private sector, and
academia are aware of the high cost related to cyberattacks and vulnerabilities
management. The public and private sectors are reducing operational cost through
automation and system integration. On the other hand, these sectors had increased their
yearly spending on cybersecurity (Clinton, 2015). The private sector is spending more
than “$100 billion”, while the federal government spends less than “$15 billion” (Clinton,
2015, p. 55). These investments can result in a major challenge for most government
agencies, particularly those with small populations (Saxby, 2015).
Cyberattacks can force the deviation of government funds from public services to
respond and recovery efforts related to the attack (Hua & Bapna, 2013). For instance, a
cyberattack against the Departamento de Hacienda de Puerto Rico (Hacienda)
[Department of Treasury of Puerto Rico] had a cost of $30 million per day (MinelliPérez, 2017). The online tax payment system was unavailable for five days preventing
the submission of 46,000 individual tax records and payments, thus causing a significant
impact on government revenues (Tellado-Domenech, 2017). Responding and recovering
from a cyberattack can lead to unanticipated expenditure resulting in a decrease of
government service, budget deficit, and the need to increase taxes.
Political. Rowland, Rice, and Shenoi (2014) conducted a literature review to
explain the concepts of cyber power, its components, and characteristics, as well as their
importance in achieving and maintaining power. Cyberspace is a relatively new domain
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that offers “speed and reach, anonymity and protection, and the ability to create and
participate in virtual economies” (Rowland et al., 2014, p. 3). The ideologies of a cyber
state include the concept of digital citizenship where e-government and e-economy
models are used to satisfy their social contract supporting the economy and social
stability, as well as to provide services related health, education, and public safety,
among other elements (Rowland et al., 2014).
Saxby (2015) used a seminar composed of presentations “followed by a panelbased question and answer session” (p. 164) to explore the meaning of digital citizen and
its implication on policy. Internet technologies are providing the means to bridge the
communication gap between the government and its constituents (Saxby, 2015). Digital
citizenship encompasses a sense of community, right to participate, and the commitment
to take part in civic matters. However, recent incents such as Russia’s cyber intrusion on
state and local systems can affect people trust on these digital platforms (Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, 2017).
The Government of Puerto Rico uses Internet technologies to facilitate the
delivery of public services. For instance, Hacienda uses information systems to manage
lottery and tax services. Recently, this agency was the target of a cyberattack, and PII
from taxpayers could have been compromised as part of the cyber incident (MinelliPérez, 2017). Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) stressed the importance of using “legal and
technical security measures” (p. 496) to preserve confidentially and privacy. For these
reasons, Saxby (2015) identified cybersecurity as a critical element in provisioning
government services and supporting the concept of a cyber state.
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Social. Cybersecurity is a societal concern like public safety (Elmaghraby &
Losavio, 2014; Levesque, Walsh, & Whyte, 2015). Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) used
literature review to examine cybersecurity challenges in smart cities. The concept of
smart cities expands on the idea of digital citizens by benefiting from new technology,
including “energy meters, security devices, smart appliances,” among other devices
(Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014, p. 491). These systems support public services, including
water, sanitation, emergency response, and disaster recovery (Elmaghraby & Losavio,
2014). According to Kenney (2014), the United States is the target of “hundreds of
thousands of cyberattacks,” (p. 112) especially against the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems supporting critical infrastructure.
Hiller and Russell (2013) performed a literature review to explore the
cybersecurity conditions, approaches, and legal framework used in the United States and
the European Union. According to the study, “25% of all power companies globally have
been hacked by cybercriminals” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 237). In early 2000, a
SCADA system was attacked in Australia resulting in the “release 800,000 gallons of raw
sewage into adjacent rivers, parks and the grounds of a nearby hotel, destroying marine
life and creating a nauseating stench for local residents” (Kenney, 2014, p.124). Similar
attacks against SCADA systems have occurred in other countries such as Azerbaijan,
Germany, Georgia, and Turkey (Levesque et al., 2015).
Influence of Institutional Frameworks on Cybersecurity
The institutional framework serves a legal framework covering policies, directly
and indirectly, related to cybersecurity. The primary concern with this dimension is the
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absence of policies covering technology (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). According to Bertot
et al.’ (2015) literature review of information security policy and governance, “the legal
structures, frameworks, authorization, and powers regarding national and international
security” (p. 105) are continuously evolving. Tehrani et al. (2013) took advantage of case
studies to examine the jurisdictional aspect of cybersecurity. Based on the study, Tehrani
et al. affirmed that cybercrime could not be prevented, but it can be deterred through
legal frameworks and prosecution. Information security policies are essential to provide a
legal framework capable of safeguard organization, nations, and international boundaries.
Government agencies are ruled by the laws and regulations establishing their
mission and defining the context of their operational environment. Therefore, policies can
serve as a vehicle to influence the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. FISMA
of 2014 is the primary law defining the cybersecurity requirements and mandating
compliance with “related policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines” (p. 128). This
statue gives regulatory power to OMB which exercises its responsibility in the form of
circulars, memorandums, and defined reporting mechanism. Further, FISMA of 2014
assigns NIST the responsibility of developing guidelines in the form of Special
Publications (SP) and Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) to safeguard the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of national systems. However, these policies are
not mandated outside the federal government.
Local governments are “creatures of the states” (Levy, 2012, p. 68) receiving their
mandates and much of their funding from the state government. E-Government Act of
2004 is the primary law driving the use of IT to promote e-governance in Puerto Rico.
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The key objectives of this Act are represented in Figure 3. The pyramid shows the
interrelationship of the E-Government Act of 2004 objectives acting as building blocks
leading to empower citizens to be able and capable of participating in the different
aspects of democratic governance. The law requires these objectives to be achieved while
ensuring the protection of privacy, security, and availability of the information.
Therefore, the principles of cybersecurity serve as the foundation supporting all egovernment goals and objectives. Like FISMA of 2014, the E-Government Act of 2004
mandates OGP to coordinate access to information and government services with all
agencies. Moreover, OGP is responsible for developing and establishing policies and
guidelines for the protection of privacy and cybersecurity. The E-Government Act of
2004 uses a similar policy framework as FISMA of 2014 by including circulars,
memorandums, and guidelines.
Roesener et al. (2014) performed a qualitative study of information security
policy in the United States to understand the different roles, responsibilities, and
authorities influencing the national cybersecurity posture. Roesener et al. found that the
roles and responsibilities of government agencies are overlapping and lacking authority
to make decisions (Roesener et al., 2014). Similarly, the E-Government Act of 2004 is
considered vague, especially regarding the role and responsibility of government
agencies to support e-government (Certificates and Electronic Receipts Act; 3 L.P.R.A. §
8721). The vagueness of the law resulted in the development and enactment of additional
legislation to cover the gaps. OGP developed an ongoing series of policies known as TIG
to provide additional guidance to fulfill the mandate of the E-Government Act of 2004.
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Increase Citizen Participation
Promote Digital Literacy
Ensure Socially Inclusiveness
Improve Services to Citizens
Achieve Full Potential of Social,
Cultural and Commercial Information
Promote Interagency Collaboration
Efficient Government Procurement
Reduce Costs and Burdens
Protection of Privacy, Security, and
Availability

Figure 3. Puerto Rico’s e-government goals. Adapted from the E-Government Act of 2004, 3
L.P.R.A. § 991 (2004).

The TIG-003, Security of Information Systems is the foundation supporting the
cybersecurity posture of government agencies in Puerto Rico. This policy established the
general guidelines to facilitate the implementation of security controls by government
agencies and support the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems
and data assets under their jurisdiction. According to TIG-003, security is an integral part
of the system design. However, the policy does not mention audits, timelines, or
processes to review compliance at the municipal level.
In 2016, 12 years after the implementation of TIG-003 the Office of the
Comptroller of Puerto Rico issued a circular (OC-16-16) to evaluate the security controls
implemented in municipal information systems. TIG-003 introduced several critical
aspects supporting cybersecurity that are aligned with the elements of this research and
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are discussed in more detail under other TIGs. Appendix A: Cybersecurity Dimensions
Covered by TIGs shows some of the cybersecurity elements covered by TIGs. Kazemi et
al. (2012) used a mixed method case study to evaluate the success factors related to
municipal information security programs. Kazemi et al. identified compliance with
security standards as an important factor for the successful implementation of
information security programs. Nevertheless, most of the TIG series failed to reference
government and industry standards, as well as to provide detailed guidance.
Executive orders have also played a significant role within the institutional
frameworks supporting the cybersecurity posture of government agencies in Puerto Rico.
Before the enactment of the E-government Act of 2004, the government used Executive
Order OE-2000-019 to establish CIOs at the agency level. However, Executive Order
OE-2000-019 did not create a central office for managing standards, compliance, or
guidance to help the new CIOs in managing their information resources in a uniform and
secure manner. This situation led to incompatibilities among agencies information
systems causing roadblocks, duplicative efforts, and costly solutions. Further, these
conditions affected the transferability and availability of data among agencies to improve
the management and delivery of public services.
In 2009, OE-2009-009 was passed establishing the role of the CIO of Puerto Rico
and the Oficina del Principal Ejecutivo de Información del Gobierno de Puerto Rico
[Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) of Puerto Rico]. The primary
responsibilities of the CIO were advising the governor and acting as the governor’s
representative in all IT-related matters. The order made OCIO responsible for performing
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accountability of all government information systems to facilitate system integration;
identifying and reducing duplicative efforts; lowering operational cost and improving
public services. OCIO was also mandated to develop, implement, and publish policies,
standards, and best practices to protect government systems from cyber threats. The
office had a dedicated budget and the ability to manage federal, state, and local funds.
During 2015, Executive Order OE-2015-019 (2015) was ratified to repeal
Executive Order OE-2009-009 (2009). The order recognized the success of the OCIO in
fulfilling their mandates. Nevertheless, Executive Order OE-2015-019 (2015) eliminated
the role of the CIO of Puerto Rico, dismantled the OCIO, and reassigned its duties to the
DDEC. The executive order was justified from the perspective of economic development
and did not consider the impact on public administration and management of government
systems. On January 2017, the newly elected administration used an executive order to
reestablish the OCIO under the name of Servicio de Tecnología de Innovación de Puerto
Rico [Technology and Innovation Service of Puerto Rico].
Influence of Interorganizational Collaboration on Cybersecurity
The interorganizational dimension covers the collaboration and networking efforts
that interact with external organizations within the government and private sector
(Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). The interconnectivity of information systems continues to
have a transformational impact on public safety, critical infrastructure, global commerce,
and access to near real-time data (Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015;
Lozowski, 2014). However, the complexity of interconnection requires the government to
go beyond securing their systems and helping safeguard interconnected systems. Scholars

51
agree that the government alone cannot secure cyberspace and needs the support and
collaboration of other sectors (Clinton, 2015; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Hua & Bapna,
2013; Miron & Muita, 2014; Roesener et al., 2014).
Unfortunately, government agencies tend to act independently and fail to take into
consideration what is being done by other entities (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005).
Manley (2015) reviewed secondary data, including previous studies, surveys, and
interviews related to cybersecurity and PPPs. Manley (2015) explained that government
officials such as former U.S. President Obama and former CIA Director Panetta
recognized the importance of PPP to improve the national cybersecurity posture. Early
policy efforts such as the Presidential Decision Directive 63 had also recognized the
importance of public and private collaboration as part of a national cybersecurity
framework (Hiller & Russell, 2013).
More recent policy efforts like the 2009’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative included increasing cooperation between “federal, state, local and private sector
actors,” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 239) supported education and research and defined
clearer roles among partners. Similarly, HSPD 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection and its successor PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience promoted collaboration among the industry, the research community, and
government agencies, including state and local governments (Roesener et al., 2014). The
Government of Puerto Rico has also encouraged interorganizational collaboration
through legislation such as the E-Government Act of 2004 and related policies. The

52
deprecated OE-2009-009 gave the OCIO of Puerto Rico the responsibilities for IT-related
interorganizational collaboration with municipal, state, and federal agencies.
Clinton (2015) used case studies to analyze the strategies related to the success
and failure of PPPs. Policy can be used as a strategy to require government agencies to
work collectively with the private sector, especially “to identify industry-based standards
and practices worthy of voluntary adoption” (Clinton, 2015, p. 56). Yusta et al. (as cited
by Miron & Muita, 2014) mentioned that “standards bodies and federal agencies in at
least 12 countries or regions have defined criteria for security standards as well as
implementation methods” (p. 34) to lessen the complexity of risk management. PPPs can
help to achieve “a common lexicon for categorizing and managing cyber risks” that could
facilitate “a common understanding around various risk management terms,
methodologies, ideas, and language” (Clinton, 2015, p. 67).
Department of Homeland Security and Carnegie Mellon University are an
example of a PPP promoting advancement in cybersecurity through “workforce
development, process maturity, and operational resilience” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p. 36).
Similarly, municipalities could establish partnerships with local universities. Kostyuk
(2014) used a case study to understand challenges related to cybersecurity and explore
cooperation as a strategy to address them. Based on the study, small public agencies such
as municipalities should partner with other organizations to strengthen their capabilities
and collectively improve their cybersecurity posture (Kostyuk, 2014).
Collaboration can help improve problem-solving and public services through
knowledge and best practice sharing (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Furthermore,
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interorganizational collaboration can take place at all levels from municipal to
international organizations. Tehrani et al. (2013) used literature review to study
cyberattacks such as cyberterrorism from a multijurisdictional perspective. Since
cyberattacks can occur across borders, there is a need for a global response. At the
international level, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) sponsored the International
Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) which became “the world’s
first global PPP against cyber threats” (Tehrani et al., 2013, p. 214). This alliance
includes 191 countries collaborating and sharing threats “against the global financial
system, power grids, nuclear plants, and air traffic control systems” (p. 214).
Douba, Rütten, Scheidl, Soble, and Walsh (2014) linked a transdisciplinary model
with the prospect theory as a strategy to support risk-based decision making to explore
the concept of online safety, its impact, and possible approaches to addressing related
concerns. According to Douba et al. (2014), collaboration must occur across different
levels. Practical solutions must account for the value level, which encompasses
“theology, values, security and privacy, intellectual property, regulation, disclosure, and
the individual and collective good” (Douba et al., p. 43, 2014). On the other hand, the
normative level consists of “risk-based decision-making, management and planning, the
strategy for making scientific progress and knowledge sharing, legal, and political
concerns” (Douba et al., p. 43, 2014). The 2011’s U.S. International Strategy for
Cyberspace included collaboration in similar areas to facilitate “1) establishing risk-based
security practices, 2) information sharing, 3) adopting international technical security

54
standards for products and services” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 239). PPPs should serve
as a model for interorganizational collaboration on cybersecurity that can be implemented
throughout different government level, including municipalities.
Influence of Organizational Structures and Processes on Cybersecurity
The organizational dimension includes the impact of structures and processes on
the organization’s performance (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Bertot et al. (2015) described
prevention and response as critical cybersecurity processes. The former allows
organizations to manage risk before it happens while the later gives organizations the
ability to react. The capabilities to prevent and respond to cyber threats are directly
related to the organization’s structures, resources, technologies, and policies.
Organizational structures. On a centralized structure, the body of governance is
responsible for cybersecurity processes such as managing controls, awareness, and
training. On the contrary, under a decentralized structure, these responsibilities fall under
individuals or small groups with limited resources. Armbruster, Endicott-Popovskyb, and
Whittington (2013) used a case study to investigate the impact of aging infrastructure on
municipal systems. Armbruster et al. (2013) discovered that the development of
standards, the adoption methodologies, and the implementation of best practices is more
challenging for decentralized IT departments.
Moreover, Flores, Antonsen, and Ekstedt (2013) used a mixed methods research
including literature review and surveys to collect data from 578 information security
executives within the United States and Sweden. According to a recent study by Flores et
al. (2013), centralization is more efficient to achieve uniform guidance and facilitate
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information sharing. The way the organization interacts is also crucial in supporting
cybersecurity. Manley (2015) explained that implementing a bottom-up approach is
fundamental to fulfilling legal requirements and support collaboration. Previous
investigation has shown that the use of a top-down approach placed more attention on the
organization at the top while a bottom-up approach gives “autonomy to react quicker to
cyberattacks, thus being more resilient” (Manley, 2015, p. 95).
The people, their roles, and their responsibilities are also essential elements of the
organizational structure. Kazemi et al. (2012) identified seven organizational factors
required for the successful implementation of an information security program at the
municipal level. These factors are “top management support, information security policy,
job responsibilities, the motivation of the employees, awareness and training programs,
compliance with information security international standards, and using the services of
the information security external advisors” (p. 4982). Reece and Stahl (2015) performed a
qualitative study to examine cybersecurity as a profession and investigated the
perspectives of practitioners on the profession. Reece and Stahl identified the need for top
management to include the role of a cybersecurity executive such as a chief information
security officer (CISO) with the responsibility of incorporating cybersecurity as part of
the enterprise governance (Reece & Stahl, 2015). The CISO or IT leaders with
cybersecurity responsibilities must understand the organizational culture as part of policy
development and implementation (Flores et al., 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012). For instance,
organizations, where employees are hesitant to take ownership of cybersecurity efforts,
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there must be defined roles and responsibilities. A lesson learned after the cyberattack
against Hacienda was the lack of a CISO role in the agency(Minelli-Pérez, 2017).
Kazemi et al. (2012) mentioned the importance of employee motivation to support
cybersecurity. IT professionals are constantly defending their organizations from
cyberattacks, but their roles are not considered heroic. Nugent and Collar (2015) affirmed
that it is hard to differentiate their heroism versus the perception that the IT professionals
are just performing their job. This situation can negatively impact the motivation of
employees and the attractiveness of the career for new practitioners. The demand for
cybersecurity professionals is over three times greater than the offer (Levesque et al.,
2015; Reece & Stahl, 2015). IT leaders can take advantage of organizational heroes to
create a positive effect on job satisfaction. With the continuous increase in cyber threats,
it is important to maintain job attractiveness for the current and upcoming workforce.
Organizational processes. Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) used a combination
of literature, a paradigm developed by IBM, and the routine activities theory to examine
the relationship and challenges of cybersecurity in smart cities. According to the routine
activity theory, identifying suitable targets can lead to the development of technical,
operational, and administrative controls and processes to serve as capable guardians for
deterring attackers and preventing the success of their actions (Elmaghraby & Losavio,
2014). For these reasons, security controls must include processes for “prevention,
detection, and recovery” (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014, p. 496). Kazemi et al. (2012)
described information security programs as an iterative process, requiring “feedback and
continuous improvement” (p. 4984) to reduce the risks originating from cyber threats.
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Further, the process requires prevention and detection elements such as identifying
security controls and assessing their effectiveness.
Organizations rely on frameworks, standards, and best practices to model their
security programs. However, a blanket implementation of these frameworks fails to place
“attention to the differences between organizations and their information security
requirements” (Flores et al., 2013, p. 91). For instance, municipalities often serve as
critical infrastructure providers and are subject to numerous security controls and
standards (Miron & Muita, 2014). Furthermore, Rogers (as cited by Miron & Muita,
2014) mentioned that organizations like municipalities could “be seen as laggards” (p.
37) on adopting standards. Kazemi et al. (2012) explained that smaller organizations face
significant challenges due to their lack of resources.
The implementation of security controls, standards, frameworks, and best
practices are complex, costly, and time-consuming process (Miron & Muita, 2014). Hua
and Bapna (2013) reviewed current literature about “cyber terrorism, terrorism
deterrence, IS security investment, and prior studies on game theoretical models” (p. 176)
to explore key factors affecting cybersecurity investment. Hua and Bapna said that costeffective investments could improve resiliency, reduce risk, and potential negative impact
on the organization’s systems and reputation. For example, subsidizing cybersecurity
investments, certifying compliance, performing periodic audits, and sharing lessons
learned can be used by the government to improve their cybersecurity posture.
Nevertheless, budget constraints can influence the procurement of IT services based on
cost rather than best value (Armbruster et al., 2013).
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Another important factor to consider is the organizational process for remediating
vulnerabilities. Controls such as “policies and procedures for security, technical
solutions, and contracts with suppliers, service providers, and customers” (Hiller &
Russell, 2013, p. 237) are essential to mitigate vulnerabilities. Hua and Bapna (2013)
stressed the importance of addressing technical and administrative vulnerabilities to
increase the effectiveness of cybersecurity investments. Asset management is a crucial
element in vulnerability management. Asset management includes the procedures for
conducting inventory on municipal assets, allocation of resources, capital planning, and
the forecasting of resources and requirements while complying with pertinent regulations
(Armbruster et al., 2013). Unfortunately, asset management could be constrained by the
absence of the resources to support the process.
Influence of Information and Data on Cybersecurity
The information and data dimension encompass elements such as availability,
integrity, completeness, and quality of data assets (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). The lack of
high-quality data was a contributing factor affecting IT projects. Similarly, information
and data deficiency could have an impact on cybersecurity operations. Cybersecurity is
“a human-centered process, fully informed by both technical and social aspects” (Reece
& Stahl, 2015, p. 182). For this reason, attackers are concentrating on social components
over technical vulnerabilities (Flores et al., 2013). Adams and Makramalla (2015)
explored gamification and entrepreneurial perspectives as strategies to strength awareness
training and improve resiliency against human exploits. As part of their literature review,
Adams and Makramalla highlighted recent studies showing that 80% of cybersecurity
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exploits are related to the human element. Therefore, it is critical to consider the
accessibility, availability, and completeness of the data needed to help end users and IT
professionals secure their organizations and improve their cybersecurity posture.
According to a recent report, 24% of participants stated that the effectiveness of
their organizations in dealing with cyber incidents has declined (Lozowski, 2015).
Scholars agree that most security programs lack the methodology and empirical data to
measure their effectiveness (Flores et al., 2013). The lack of empirical data affects the
ability of IT leaders to understand and improve the cybersecurity posture of their
organizations. Methodologies such as such cybersecurity capability maturity models can
be used for measuring hierarchical progress related to “conditions, processes, or
application targets” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p. 36). These measurements can capture
historical performance data in alignment with defined maturity levels. This information
can then be used to support the development of strategies to move the organization into a
more desirable state.
Douba et al. (2014) affirmed that there is a relationship between digital literacy
and cyber resiliency. Unfortunately, there is limited access to “highly qualified
personnel” (Levesque et al., 2015, p. 29) with an appropriate level of cybersecurity
knowledge and experience. Personnel without an appropriate level of expertise could
have an adverse impact on their organization’s security posture. Insiders with legitimate
"access to an organization’s information or information systems” (Posey, Roberts,
Lowry, & Hightower, 2014, p. 551) can commit inadvertent actions such as
unintentionally activate a malicious payload.
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The cyberattack against Hacienda used a human exploit strategy know as
ransomware where someone internal inadvertently clicked on a malicious payload that
encrypted a portion of the agency’s data assets prohibiting access to the systems and data
(Tellado-Domenech, 2017). Chen and Dongre (2014) performed a qualitative study to
understand the motives of attackers to develop better controls to protect systems. In
addition to inadvertent actions, insiders can have motives to deliberately commit actions
with malicious intent (Chen & Dongre, 2014). One of the most dangerous actions is
inaction. According to a recent study, 54% of data compromises occurred during 2013
were related to negligence (Adams & Makramalla, 2015).
Douba et al. (2014) identified seven knowledge domains that are necessary for
online safety, including knowledge transfer or information sharing. Information sharing
supports advancement in “cybersecurity tools and techniques” (Levesque et al., 2015, p.
30). Information sharing is the distribution of information to facilitate collaboration,
problem-solving, innovation, and implementation of governance (Flores et al., 2013).
Flores et al. (2013) revealed that the participants in their study affirmed coordination of
security activities affects information sharing, particularly related to “risk management
and performance monitoring” (p. 97).
Conducting security assessments requires the coordination of security activities.
For instance, the vulnerabilities discovered during security assessments must be shared
with the proper personnel for remediation. Failure to properly communicate these
findings can place the organization at risk of cyberattacks. Muegge and Craigen (2015)
used a combination of secondary data, conversations with practitioners, and the
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perceptions of graduate students within a design science approach for developing a
process for improving the quality and dissemination of risk data. Muegge and Craigen
affirmed that elements such as “secrecy, competition, and public image” (Muegge &
Craigen, 2015) serve as deterring factors to information sharing affecting the
organization’s ability to learn, manage, and mitigate cyber threats.
PricewaterhouseCoopers reported that the annual losses of organizations without
cybersecurity awareness training reported an average of 76% higher losses than those
organizations that provided training (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). Posey et al. (2014)
conducted qualitative semistructured interviews with 33 participants, including 11
insiders and 22 security professionals from different organizations within the United
States to compare their perceptions on cybersecurity-related matters. The findings make
of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs an essential part of the
organization’s security program (Posey et al., 2014). The use of appropriate awareness
training could have served as a mitigation control to deter the success of the cyberattack
against Hacienda. Nevertheless, awareness training alone does not provide adequate
means to develop the necessary skills to protect organizations (Adams & Makramalla,
2015; Reece & Stahl, 2015). Strategies such as gamification facilitate information
dissemination and understanding allowing participants to increase their skills to prevent
and mitigate cyber threats (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). Employees should have a clear
understanding of the organization’s cybersecurity goals and “that security is everybody’s
job” (Posey et al., 2014, p. 565).
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Influence of Technology on Cybersecurity
The technology dimension consists of information systems components, as well
as their compatibility, usage, and management (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p.107).
Technology represents both threats and opportunities. Levesque et al. (2015) completed a
qualitative study on the challenges inhibiting cybersecurity. According to Levesque et al.,
complexity is a key factor affecting cybersecurity. Cisco projected a total of 50 billion
devices connected to the Internet by 2020 (Levesque et al., 2015). The increase in
systems interconnectivity introduces “new vulnerabilities, adversarial threats, and
challenges” (Levesque et al., 2015, p. 26) affecting the security of the systems and related
data. Further, technology gives attackers the ability to target information systems from
anywhere in the world. Failing to understand these challenges and adapt to new
technologies could have adverse effects on government operations and their constituents.
On the other hand, new technologies also represent opportunities to manage,
mitigate, prevent, and respond to cyber threats. Levesque et al. (2015) identified seven
factors to improve the cybersecurity posture of organizations, three of which were related
to the use of cybersecurity-related technologies. The use of antivirus, firewalls, intrusion
detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), among other security
appliances, is essential to prevent and respond to cyberattacks (Hua & Bapna, 2013;
Levesque et al., 2015). Furthermore, the implementation of systems capable of
automatically responding to cyberattacks without human interaction is crucial to
improving the organization’s cybersecurity posture (Kostyuk, 2014; Levesque et al.,
2015). For instance, an IDS is only capable of detection and notification, while an IPS
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can apply learned patterns and analysis to respond to cyberattacks automatically.
According to a recent report, Russia access to state and local system since 2014 was
discovered by U.S. intelligence instead of the people responsible for the systems (Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The use of cybersecurity technology
solutions can help to identify and prevent cyber intrusion.
These technologies are expensive and could require hiring personnel with
specialized capabilities or reeducate the current staff. However, the effect of cyberattacks
against government institutions could be even more costly. For instance, the impact of the
recent cyberattack against Hacienda has been estimated to cost over $30 million without
counting the recovery and remediation efforts (Minelli-Pérez, 2017). Maheux (2014)
merged an intention-based classification of malware and an optimal timing model as a
tool to “help predict the timing of malware based on its classification” (p. 34). Maheux
(2014), emphasized a recent report by Symantec explaining that the annual impact of
cybercrime exceeds $110 billion and affects 566 million victims. Kadivar (2014)
examined 10 high-profile cyberattacks and identified six attributes in common, including
vector, vulnerability, malicious software, botnet reliance, origin, and destination. The
attack vector is the entry point to commit “the exploitation” (Kadivar, 2014, p. 24).
Malicious software or malware includes the “viruses, worms, trojan horses, and spyware”
(Maheux, 2014, p. 34) used to commit cyberattacks. Ransomware was the malware used
on the cyberattack against Hacienda. This type of malware encrypts data assets and
request payment to decrypt the data and regain access to the information.
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These technologies have continued to improve their capability to bypass
detection, replicate, and open covert channels to establish command and control (Hua &
Bapna, 2013). Zeus is an example of malware stealth to antiviruses that compromised
over 74,000 accounts in 2007 from “Bank of America, NASA, Monster.com, ABC,
Oracle, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek” (Maheux, 2014, p. 35) causing economic
losses of over $70 million. Maheux (2014) merged an intention-based classification of
malware and an optimal timing model as a tool to “help predict the timing of malware
based on its classification” (p. 34). In the case of the cyberattack against Hacienda, this
timing of malware could have helped predict that an agency responsible for collecting
taxes have a higher probability to be attacked during tax season. Understanding the
relationship between the timing, categorization, and intention of malware can improve
the ability to defend information systems resources and data assets.
Sá et al. (2015) used convenience sampling to identify 25 participants for a 20minute questionnaire about local e-government. Sá et al. explained that e-government
consists of the implementation of technological solutions to enable communication and
services with internal and external parties such as constituents, other government
agencies, and the private sector. This approach has increased the government’s
dependency on “energy and computing infrastructures” (Armbruster et al., 2013, p.123)
to support e-government and e-democracy. Armbruster et al. (2013) used a case study
approach to explore the impact of a cyber incident related to aging infrastructure and
raised awareness on the importance of protecting critical systems. Based on the study,
Armbruster et al. recommend hosting data centers with appropriate infrastructure and

65
avoid “repurposing buildings that were not intended to accommodate the requirements of
critical computing infrastructures” (p. 124).
Information systems must be resilient to human-made and natural disasters.
Therefore, government agencies need to identify contingency strategies to support their
critical systems and operations. A recent survey showed that out 71% of organizations
with tested business continuity plans, half reported: “technical, equipment, logistical or
management problems during an exercise” (Armbruster et al., 2013, p. 125). During the
attack against Hacienda, it was discovered that contingency planning and testing was not
performed contributing to the loss of 50 terabytes of data because of the attack (MinelliPérez, 2017). Developing and managing contingency plans can be costly and difficult for
government agencies to maintain after budget cuts. Cloud services can also facilitate
disaster recovery and continuity of operations, improving the resilience of systems and
processes. The U.S. General Services Administration is leading an initiative to
consolidate 40% of the federal agencies’ data centers to reduce operational costs and
facilitate technical improvements.
Summary and Conclusions
The literature surrounding cybersecurity has continued to expand and contribute
to the body of knowledge. However, research attention continues to focus on
cybersecurity at the national and international level. Local governments use the same data
types to fulfill their mandates as first responders, critical infrastructure providers, and
enablers for social and economic development within their jurisdiction (Miron & Muita,
2014; Sylves, 2015). These data assets reside within cyberspace and depend on
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interconnectivity to other systems. Attacks against these information resources can
adversely affect the operations of the targeted, as well as the interconnected systems.
These conditions should drive more attention toward cybersecurity at the local level.
The literature search strategy concentrated on the research problem and not in the
conceptual framework. However, the major themes found during the literature review
were in alignment with the dimensions influencing digital government. Also, most of the
literature was consistent with themes within the predefined dimensions. For instance, the
elements captured within the general context dimensions included economic, political,
and social factors. These factors played a significant role in understanding cyberattack
attributes such as objectives, actors, and targets (Fok, 2015; Kadivar, 2014; Kenney,
2014). Regarding the institutional framework, the literature supports the need for
standards and information security policies (Armbruster et al., 2013; Clinton, 2015;
Flores et al., 2013; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012; Miron & Muita, 2014;
Picazo-Vela et al., 2012; Tehrani et al., 2013).
System interconnectivity and limited resources were major themes under
interorganizational collaboration and networks. As technology continues to evolve, more
systems are interconnected. This characteristic improves productivity but expands the
surface of attack to include vulnerabilities in the interconnections and the interconnected
systems (Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015; Lozowski, 2014). On the other
hand, interorganizational collaboration can improve problem-solving, reduce
administrative overhead, and benefit from the strength of other organizations to
collectively improve cybersecurity (Flores et al., 2013; Picazo-Vela et al. (2012). The
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literature favored the use of centralized organizational structures and bottom-up
communication for achieving and supporting a resilient cybersecurity posture
(Armbruster et al., 2013; Flores et al., 2013; Manley, 2015). Most of the organizational
processes found during the literature review were related to the concepts of prevention,
detection, and recovery (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014; Kazemi et al., 2012).
The literature also supported the importance of information and data in achieving
a resilient cybersecurity posture. Information about the security policies, cyber threats,
and mitigation strategies needs to be available, accessible and well disseminated (Douba
et al., 2014; Flores et al., 2013; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015; Muegge &
Craigen, 2015). Similarly, technology must be available, procured, and properly
configured. Scholars agree on the importance of the implementation of cybersecurityrelated technologies, especially those capable of automatically responding to cyberattacks
without human interaction (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Kostyuk, 2014; Levesque et al., 2015).
Most of the literature concentrated on identifying missing technical, operational,
and administrative controls, and providing possible solutions to improve cybersecurity.
For instance, information security policies, collaboration, cybersecurity processes,
information sharing, awareness and training, and cybersecurity-related technologies were
some of the controls identified in literature needing to be developed, implemented, or
improved to achieve a resilient posture. However, the literature did not explore why these
security controls were not present or why these possible solutions were not implemented
in the first place. Understanding what is affecting the local government’s ability to
achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture could help to identify the groundwork required
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to upkeep the development and implementations of cybersecurity controls which
consequentially could improve and maintain their posture.
This study could contribute to the resolution of two major gaps in the literature.
The first gap is the absence of cybersecurity research outside a national and international
context. This study provided research-based data on the cybersecurity posture of local
governments. The second gap is related to the factors affecting the development and
implementation of security controls. The literature contained evidence of the use of
security controls to improve cybersecurity. However, the literature lacked focus on the
challenges and factors affecting the adoption of such security controls. Understanding
these factors is essential for the development of cost-effective solutions that are suitable
for each local government agency. These contributions could extend knowledge in public
policy, public administration, and IT management.
The following chapter describes the research methods for this study. The research
methodology is in alignment with the gap discovered during the literature review. A
significant portion of the literature was solely based on a literature review with no
additional connection to participants. Several researchers took advantage of case studies,
interviews, and expert advice as part of their methodology. Based on the significant gap
in literature and knowledge about cybersecurity at the local government level, a
qualitative phenomenological approach could be crucial to extend knowledge in the
discipline by studying information-rich cases to collect as much data as possible about
the phenomenon. Chapter 3 included detailed descriptions of the research design, the
researcher’s role, methodology, and strategies to address potential trustworthiness issues.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The research design for this study facilitated the understanding of the
cybersecurity posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico. This phenomenon involved the
readiness of municipal governments’ “networks, information, and systems based on IA
resources (e.g., people, processes, technologies) and capabilities in place to manage the
defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179).
Furthermore, this study addressed key factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of
municipalities. The outcomes of this investigation may help to improve the cybersecurity
of government agencies in Puerto Rico by providing advances in knowledge that could
support the development of administrative, operational, and technical controls.
Phenomenology was the qualitative design used to conduct the study. This design
is used to explore the human experience with the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994). The
study included a transcendental approach to concentrate on the essence of the experiences
of IT leaders. The understanding of the phenomenon and related elements was gained
through the perceptions of public servants leading IT efforts at the municipal level. A
sample of this population was drawn from settings consisting of highly populated
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA.
This chapter includes the rationale for the research design, the role of the
researcher, the methodology, and issues related to trustworthiness. The design rationale
includes the reasoning for using transcendental phenomenology for the study. Bracketing
was used to explain my experience with the phenomenon and manage biases. The
methodology section includes comprehensive details about the selection of participants,
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the research instrument, data collection, and data analysis. Also, this chapter addresses
ethical concerns and mitigation strategies to support the trustworthiness of the study.
Research Design and Rationale
The research questions supported the purpose of the study and indicated the
appropriate method for conducting the study. A combination of two qualitative research
questions guided this study. These research questions addressed the perceptions of IT
leaders concerning their lived experiences with cybersecurity:
RQ1: How do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive the cybersecurity
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico?
RQ2: What factors do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive as most
influential to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture in government municipalities in
Puerto Rico?
The central question of the study was RQ1. This question was used to understand
the readiness of government municipalities to protect and defend information resources.
Although the primary research question could have resulted in a positive or negative
understanding of the phenomenon, RQ2 focused on the elements influencing the
understanding. This question was designed to provide a deeper understanding of the
factors enabling or hindering public servants in protecting their information resources and
data assets. Identifying and understanding influential factors are critical steps in
developing strategies to stimulate conditions for improving cybersecurity and to mitigate
those conditions preventing advances in its posture.
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The central phenomenon of the study was the cybersecurity posture of the
municipal government. The concept of cybersecurity relates to the capabilities required to
safeguard information resources within cyberspace from cyber threats such as
cyberattacks. Cyberattacks are intended to disrupt, disable, destroy, or control information
resources, and to destroy data integrity or steal sensitive information (Kissel, 2013). The
government’s dependency on information resources has made cybersecurity a relevant
phenomenon to study, especially as it relates to the posture of government agencies. The
concept of security posture refers to the status of security controls in place by
organizations such as municipal governments to manage and react to cyber incidents
(Kissel, 2013). Failing to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture can be detrimental to
government systems, municipal governance, local economy, and public safety.
FOIA of 1966 safeguards most of the quantitative data related to cybersecurity
from public disclosure. Cybersecurity data protected by FOIA of 1966 could include
security assessments, audits, vulnerabilities, and security plans. Qualitative research
provides the tools for understanding and “exploring the meaning individuals or groups
ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2013, Chapter 3: Summary, para. 1).
Therefore, the insights of individuals can be used as reliable sources to study
cybersecurity as a social problem. The research design for this study adhered to the
characteristics of the qualitative research.
The five qualitative research traditions include narrative, phenomenological,
grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study (Creswell, 2013). Each tradition provides a
different scholarly structure for organizing and presenting ideas (Creswell, 2013). In the
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current study, phenomenology provided the framework to substantiate the collection and
analysis of data grounded in participants’ experiences. The study centered on the
experiences of public servants regarding cybersecurity in IT leadership roles at the
municipal level. Using phenomenology as the research methodology enabled me to
explore the research problem and capture the essence of the phenomenon.
Previous researchers have taken advantage of phenomenology to explore
phenomena related to cybersecurity. Moore (2014) used phenomenology to explore the
development of information security policies to safeguard national security and deter
cybercrime. Heuristic and transcendental are the two major research approaches within the
tradition of phenomenology. These approaches provide slightly different philosophies and
frameworks. In the current study, transcendental phenomenology provided a suitable
approach to address the research questions in alignment with the purpose.
Heuristic phenomenology requires researchers to “have personal experience and
intense interest in the phenomenon” (Patton, 2002, Heuristic Inquiry, para. 2). In addition
to the connection to the phenomenon, the heuristic approach emphasizes connecting with
the participants. Moustakas (1994) explained that heuristic inquiry concentrates more on
understanding the experience rather than the phenomenon. Heuristic phenomenology
facilitates understanding of the phenomenon through “shared reflection and inquiry”
(Patton, 2002, Heuristic Inquiry, para. 4). In traditional science, the characteristics of a
heuristic approach can raise concerns regarding the objectivity of the researcher.
Transcendental phenomenology shares the heuristic principle of connectedness.
Transcendental phenomenology also follows a “disciplined and systematic” (Moustakas,
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1994, p. 21) approach. This approach includes a process known as epoche or bracketing.
According to Moustakas (1994), bracketing gives researchers the means to set aside
“prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas about things” (p. 21). As a professional, I
had experienced the phenomenon of inquiry while performing in diverse roles at different
government levels for 17 years. These experiences may have contributed to
prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas about cybersecurity, especially as it relates
to the posture of governments. The bracketing process supported the objectivity while
sustaining the use of intuition, which was fundamental for the study.
Moustakas (1994) affirmed that reality is subject to the person perceiving it.
Studying the perception of the reality of the cybersecurity posture of government
municipalities depended on the lived experiences of the participants. This concept
provided different insights into the phenomenon and the elements influencing it. In
transcendental phenomenology, the process of converting empirical experience into
essential insights is known as ideation (Moustakas, 1994). Through ideation, the
consciousness of the participants is associated with the phenomenon creating meaning
and extending the current body of knowledge. The previously discussed conditions
supported the rationale of using transcendental phenomenology as the research design.
Bracketing is further described in Chapter 4 as part of the evidence of trustworthiness.
Role of the Researcher
The researcher is the principal research tool for data collection in qualitative
methods. Creswell (2013) explained that researchers could engage participants through
different roles ranging from participatory to nonparticipatory. These roles include
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complete participants, participants as observers, observers as participants, and complete
observers. Depending on the role, researchers can take advantage of their sense of sight,
hearing, touch, smell, and taste (Creswell, 2013). For this study, I adhered to the role of
participant observer.
Phenomenological inquiry involves interviews as a key data collection strategy
(Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002). The current study included the use of
face-to-face interviews requiring interaction with the participants. The participant observer
role allowed me to interact with participants while using multiple senses to collect
comprehensive data. In a face-to-face interview, the researcher can use sight to analyze the
body language and facial expressions of the participants. Further, the researcher can use
hearing to listen to the responses and notice distress or other emotion in the participant’s
tone of voice. Depending on the situation, researchers have the flexibility to adjust the role
or degree of participation (Creswell, 2013).
Biases are “prejudice in favor of or against one thing” (New Oxford American
Dictionary, n.d.). The background and experiences of a researcher can result in biases.
The susceptibility of qualitative research to researcher bias acts as a limitation that can
affect the objectivity of the study. In phenomenology, this limitation becomes stronger as
researchers tend to be more connected to the research problem. The participants in this
study were not related to me in any personal or professional way. The interaction with
participants involved my role as a researcher with no power relationship over them.
Transcendental phenomenology encompasses a bracketing process that helps the
researcher manage possible bias. Other strategies to manage bias include the use of an
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interview protocol and semistructured questions. The interview protocol and
semistructured questions facilitated focusing on the research problem and prevent
deviation toward possible biases. The participant observer role enabled the use of probing
questions and other strategies to stimulate and engage the participant. This level of
flexibility aided the collection of comprehensive data about the cybersecurity
phenomenon that otherwise may have been lost.
Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
The research design covers the population and “the unit of analysis to be studied”
(Patton, 2002, Unit of Analysis, para. 3). The public sector constituted the finite
population for this study. The lived experiences of public servants were the unit of
analysis. The sample included public servants who had experienced the phenomenon
while working in a municipal setting. IT leaders were defined as individuals performing
senior-level IT functions.
Creswell (2013) recommended studying multiple sites as well as individuals. The
San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA is the most populated area in Puerto Rico (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2015a). The municipalities of San Juan, Bayamon, Carolina, Caguas,
Guaynabo, Toa Baja, and Toa Alta have a population between 74,368 and 355,074
inhabitants. Table 1 shows the seven municipalities with their corresponding populations.
Criterion sampling takes into consideration cases meeting a “predetermined
criterion of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). For this study, the
criteria included participants who were public servants; in IT leadership role; and had at
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least 2 years of experience working within highly populated municipalities. The
participants meeting these criteria had more experience with the phenomenon and were
able to provide relevant data to the inquiry. A 2-step approach was followed to ensure
that the participants met the criteria. The first step was working with municipalities listed
in Table 1 to identify candidates who meet the criteria. A letter of cooperation was used
with the municipalities to obtain their permission before reaching out to the candidates.
The second step included corroborating the criteria with the participants. The criteria
information of the participants was documented as part of the interview protocol.
Table 1
Populations of Research Sites
Municipality
San Juan
Bayamon
Carolina
Caguas
Guaynabo
Toa Baja
Toa Alta

Population
355,074
189,159
161,884
134,481
90,879
82,065
74,368

*Estimate from 2015 obtained from U.S. Census Bureau

Patton (2002) stated that “there are no rules for sampling in qualitative inquiry.”
Nevertheless, having an equal number of participants from each municipality may be a
contributing factor to the credibility of the data. For consistency, the sample size was
formed from an equal number consisting of two participants per site. A sample size of 10
to 14 participants can facilitate the collection of in-depth and reliable information.
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Therefore, a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 14 participants were considered an
acceptable sample size.
The process of identifying, contacting, and recruiting participants started after the
approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The first step was reaching out by
phone to the municipalities listed in Table 1 to obtain their collaboration in the
identification, recruitment, and interview locations. Their agreement to collaborate were
documented in a letter of cooperation. The telephone conversation followed a script
reviewed by the IRB which includes a summary of the purpose of the study, the sampling
criteria, and verification that the public servants met the criteria. If the potential
participants met the criteria, an invitation to participate was issued. If the potential
participant accepted, a consent form with a sample of the interview questions, the
explanation of the conditions for audio recording, and the confidentiality of participant
information was sent by email to make official their participation in the study.
Creswell (2013) emphasized that the sample size is as important as the sampling
strategy. Qualitative research provides a sense of balance between the breadth and depth
of the investigation. This tradeoff provided the opportunity to concentrate on a smaller
sample size to attempt to collect more data. In phenomenological studies, it is
recommended to work with a sample size ranging from five to 25 participants (Creswell,
2013). A sample size within this range is sufficient to reach saturation. The study started
with a minimum of 10 participants as an acceptable sample size. Depending on the level
of saturation, up to four more participants could be recruited and interviewed for a total
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of 14. This strategy ensured a positive relationship between saturation and sample size
while providing the flexibility to concentrate on information-rich cases.
Instrumentation
A phenomenological approach was used to concentrate on the lived experiences
of the participants. Therefore, the data collection instrument was crucial to capturing the
essence the experiences of the participants with the phenomenon. Qualitative data consist
of observation, interviews, documents, and audiovisual materials (Creswell, 2013). Each
type of data can be subject to a variety of data collection techniques. Observing IT
leaders performing during a cyber incident in person or through audiovisuals may not be
appropriate due to potential legal concerns about exposing sensitive information. A
similar situation could emerge in the review of artifacts that could be valuable to the
study. However, artifacts such as security assessments, vulnerabilities, and security plans
are exempted from public release under the FOIA of 1966. However, the use of
interviews is appropriate for the proposed qualitative research plan.
Interviews served as the data collection instrument. Phenomenology “consists of
in-depth and multiple interviews with participants” (Creswell, 2013, “Procedure for
Conducting Phenomenological,” para. 5). The intent of using this approach was to gain
an understanding of how IT leaders perceive the cybersecurity posture of municipalities
in Puerto Rico. Creswell (2013) and Patton (2002) agreed on the use of in-depth
interviews with individuals who have experienced the phenomenon. Therefore, the
methodology for the study included in-depth face-to-face interviews. The interviews
incorporated open-ended questions and follow a semistructured protocol. Using a

79
semistructured protocol helped to maintain the participants within scope, and not limit
their responses.
The protocol included a total of 13 questions. The questions were aligned with
the research problem, the conceptual framework, and the literature review. This
alignment in combination with the reviews of the Dissertation Supervisory Committee
and the University Research Reviewer (URR) supported the content validity of the
instrument. The interview protocol generated sufficient and relevant data. The themes
and codes discovered during the literature review were associated with the dimensions
influencing digital government and the questions in the instrument were related to these
concepts. Appendix B includes the interview protocol with the 13 questions that were
used as part of the data collection instrument. In addition to these questions, the interview
protocol required the collection of information such as the date, place of the meeting, and
confirmation that the participant is meeting the criteria.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The recruitment process consisted of contacting the selected municipalities to
obtain their consent to recruit potential participants. Their collaboration in the recruitment
process was part of a letter of cooperation established with each of the municipalities.
Potential participants were contacted by phone to validate that they meet the criteria to
participate in the study. If a potential participant expresses interest in the study or needs
additional information before deciding to participate, a consent form was made available
to complete the recruitment process. The purpose of the form was to provide a
description of the research, details about the data collection, and to ensure voluntary
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participation and confidentiality. The process continued until completing the recruitment
of two participants per municipality for a minimum of 10. This sample size was aligned
with Creswell’s (2013) recommendation of using between five to 25 participants to
achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.
The data collection was performed via face-to-face interviews with the
participants using an interview protocol. The interview was audio recorded. Patton (2002)
explained that recorders do not remove the need for taking notes. Instead, recorders offer
an opportunity to concentrate on taking strategic notes. For this reason, the plan included
using a combination of field notes, mind maps, and audio recording. I was responsible for
conducting the interview, taking notes, and setting up the recording. The combination of
data types helped to prevent data overload by providing the means to go back to the
audio, transcripts, or field notes to evaluate data that could have been overlooked during
the collection process. The data collection event occurred once with each participant. The
duration of the interviews was around 50 minutes.
If recruitment results in less than 10 participants or limited information for the
study, the process could be repeated. If necessary, other municipalities within the San
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA with a population higher than 70,000 such as Toa Baja
and Toa Alta, could have been contacted. The participants entered and exited the
interview after a debriefing that was part of the interview protocol. Follow-up procedures
occurred by phone and e-mail to support the member checking strategy. Figure 4 shows
all the highly populated municipalities that could have been targeted during the study.
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Figure 4. San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA and highly populated municipalities. Adapted from
“San Juan-Carolina, PR Combined Statistical Area” by U.S. Census Bureau, 2012.

Data Analysis Plan
Organizing and coding the data from the field notes, mind maps, and audio
recording were the initial steps in the data analysis process. These data types share an
overlapping connection to the research questions. However, the mind mapping is related
to RQ2. Mind mapping served as a “modeling technique which intends to portray ideas,
beliefs, values, and attitudes and their relationship” (Burgess-Allen & Owen-Smith, 2010,
p. 407). This technique facilitated the identification of the most influential factors for
achieving a resilient cybersecurity posture and their relationship.
The field notes were planned to be captured using a computer and a word
processor. The audio was recorded using a digital recorder. Later, the recordings were
converted into transcripts. NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software used to support
data coding, analysis, interpretation, and representation (QSR International, n.d.). After

82
organizing the data into a computer using files and folders, the data were uploaded into
NVivo. The mind mapping was also transferred into NVivo. Horizontalization was the
first step in the coding strategy. This process involved listing all the relevant experiences
about cybersecurity expressed during the interviews. These experiences underwent a
process of reduction, including grouping the horizons into “meaning units” (Creswell,
2013, “Phenomenological Analysis,” para. 1). The initial meaning units started as codes
that later were group into themes. The coding strategy utilized a combination of
predetermined and emerging codes.
Creswell (2013) recommends starting the coding process with no more than six
categories and then expand as necessary. The initial codes included elements such as
policies, processes, collaboration, budget, and technology. NVivo’s pattern-based
automatic coding was attempted to facilitate the process. Then, codes were grouped into
themes describing ideas related to the experiences of the IT leaders and the essence of the
cybersecurity posture. These strategies contributed to describing the cybersecurity
posture of the municipalities and in identifying those variables that according to the
participants have the most significant influence on the phenomenon.
Clustering and thematizing were imperative for the interpretation and
representation of the research data. Themes are defined as “broad units of information”
(Creswell, 2013, “Describing, Classifying, and Interpreting,” para. 6). These units are
encompassed by invariant codes that when combined form an idea related to the theme.
Creswell (2013) affirmed that selecting between five to seven themes is a common
practice for data analysis. Emerging topics were discovered during the data analysis.
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Burgess-Allen and Owen-Smith (2010) described mind maps as illustrations representing
“concepts, ideas or tasks linked to and arranged radially around a central key word or
idea” (p. 407). The primary branches departed from predetermined themes originating
from the dimensions influencing digital government framework. The major ideas
included concepts such as general, institutional, collaboration, organizational, data, and
technology. The relevant experiences that cannot be clustered or labeled under the
predetermined themes lead to the development of new themes.
After coding the data, a deeper analysis and interpretation was performed. The
effectiveness of the data analysis techniques varies with the type of research approach.
Creswell (2013) proposed a simplified variation of Moustakas’ as the preferred data
analysis technique to analyze data for a phenomenological study. First, the researcher’s
personal experience with the phenomenon was described through the process of
bracketing. This process allows researchers to set aside personal experience and
concentrate on the participants (Creswell, 2013).
Individual textural descriptions for each participant were developed as part of the
process. These descriptions explained the state of affairs experienced by the participants
(Creswell, 2013). Based on the textural descriptions, individual structural descriptions
explaining how the experience occurred could be developed (Creswell, 2013). The
analysis incorporated the textural descriptions into comprehensive passage known as a
composite description. Creswell (2013) refers to this passage as the essence of the
phenomenological experienced. Phenomenology studies “the common meaning for several
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon” (Creswell, 2013,
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Definition and Background, para. 1). The composite description represented the
experiences of the participants as a whole.
Discrepant cases were treated following the data analysis plan. During the
horizontalization, all statements were given equal value. Then the cases were tested for
reduction or elimination. This test included analyzing the relevance to understanding the
phenomenon and fitting statements within the predetermined labels. If discrepant cases
are relevant, but not aligned with codes and themes, new labels emerged as part of the
clustering and thematizing process. Discrepant cases could provide a valuable alternate
insight into the cybersecurity posture of government municipalities.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
Reviewing the data with the participants is essential for supporting credibility
(Creswell, 2013). Member checking consists of sharing the “analysis, interpretations, and
conclusion” (Creswell, 2013, Validation Strategies, para. 7) with the participants of the
study. This strategy provided an opportunity to reach back to the participants for
feedback on the researcher’s interpretation versus the essence of their original statements.
This strategy allowed the participants to provide an accurate judgment of the research
data. The data were shared with the participants by email and was limited to the results.
External validity also plays a major role in the trustworthiness of the research.
External audits can help to support the validity of the research. The Dissertation
Supervisory Committee served as external auditors. The Committee included a content
expert, methodology experts, and the URR. The content and methodology experts
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provided guidance and support to ensure the quality and relevance of the research. These
committee's members were engaged throughout all the phases of the research process.
Similarly, the URR provided an additional layer of review which served as a quality
assurance mechanism for the research. The committee's guidance and support were
crucial to the quality and credibility of the study.
Transferability
Cybersecurity is a new phenomenon, in particular as it relates to the posture of the
local government. Providing enough information to support the possible transferability of
the study and the findings to other settings was crucial to help reduce the knowledge gap
about this phenomenon. The literature review was presented in Chapter 2 with references
to all the artifacts reviewed during the process. Chapter 3 provided a thick description of
the methodology that could facilitate replicating the study in another setting. Any
deviations to the design were discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Chapter 4 included
detailed descriptions of the settings, codes, themes, and other characteristics as a means
for readers to determine the transferability of the findings to other settings.
Dependability
The dependability of the research was supported using audit trails, including
artifacts documenting the identification of the problem, prospectus, literature review,
research design, data collection instrument and evidence of the collection, data analysis,
and interpretation of the findings. The identification of the research problem as well as
preliminary frameworks, designs, methodologies, and implications were captured in a
historical alignment tool. A prospectus outlining the problem, purpose, research
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questions, and a high-level view of the proposed research design, framework and
methodology were approved before starting the research.
The approved data collection instrument is available as in Appendix B. The data
collection was evidenced by the interview schedule, field notes, and audio recording.
These data types were used to support audit trails among the collected data. For instance,
the audio recordings were converted into transcription to be compared with the field
notes and mind maps. This strategy supported dependability by allowing me to cross
reference the different data sources. Lastly, the interpretation of the findings was
documented in composite descriptions that were validated through member checking.
Confirmability
According to Patton (2002), confirmability is essential to reducing bias,
improving accuracy, and supporting impartiality of the research. The National Research
Council (2009) states that the values that apply to research are the same values that relate
to life. These values include “honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness,
and respect for others” (National Research Council, 2009, p. 3). Researcher bias can
interfere with these values and the objectivity of the research which could lead to
misleading results. O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2008) cautioned that researchers
could influence qualitative research. The research design included bracketing as a form of
reflexivity to support confirmability which was covered in Chapter 4.
Like dependability, confirmability is achieved through an auditing process
(Creswell, 2013). Patton (2002) explained that auditing of the research process supports
dependability. On the other hand, auditing the results supports confirmability. This
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auditing process fell over “the doctoral committee for graduate students and peer
reviewers for scholarly journals” (Patton, 2002, Expert Audit Review, para. 1). The
Dissertation Supervisory Committee and the URR served as the auditors for the overall
trustworthiness of the research. These strategies provided confirmability by clarifying
research bias, suspending prejudgments, and maintaining objectivity.
Ethical Procedures
Identifying and addressing ethical concerns and risks are crucial in scholarly
research, including human participants. Walden University (2015) offers a Research
Ethics Planning Worksheet to assist in the identification and management of ethical
concerns. This worksheet was used as the preliminary tool to identify and address ethical
concerns throughout the proposed research process. After the research proposal was
approved, the Application for Research Ethics Review was submitted to the IRB.
The IRB ensured that the research agrees with University’s ethical standards, as
well as with pertinent laws and regulations to protect living persons from unethical
practices and unnecessary risk as part of a research process (Walden University, 2018).
The form included questions related to ethics, integrity, and confidentiality. The form
required detailed procedures for recruitment and data collection, as well as for conducting
a risk assessment. The form also covered conflict of interest, among other ethical matters.
The supporting documentation approved by the IRB included the interview questions
(See Appendix B), confidentiality agreement, and consent form. The IRB approval
number was 11-07-17-0421741.
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Treatment of human participants. The IRB application included a consent form
as the artifact to gain access to the participants. After the approval of the IRB, this form
was used to conclude the recruitment process by documenting the agreement of the
participant to take part in the study. The consent form was distributed with enough time
for participant review. This form included a description of the research, the data
collection process, possible risk, and benefits. Further, the consent form explained that
participation in the study is voluntary, and all information provided is kept confidential.
The treatment of human participants was performed with dignity and respect. The
recruitment of participants was fair. As described in the sampling strategy, the subjects
met the defined criteria. Studying the cybersecurity posture of local government as a
social problem offered social value and scientific validity. The outcome of the research
led to strategies that could help secure and improve government services while reducing
cost and cyber threats against sensitive data and the availability of government systems.
These benefits outweighed the risks and made of the study, worth participating.
Upon review, no ethical concerns were identified. The research design, data
collection strategy, and data analysis plan were in line with the recommendations of
Research Ethics Planning Worksheet. The recruitment method excluded special
populations and vulnerable groups. An invitation to participate was sent to potential
participants. If the participants were interested and met the criteria, the participants
completed the consent form that was provided to take part in the study. Data were not
collected without participant consent. Participants who refuse to participate could have
been withdrawn from the study with no repercussion.
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Before the interview, I reviewed the interview process, timeframe, and recording
procedures to confirm the participants’ understanding of the process and conditions. The
interview commenced after making sure that the participants do not have questions and
are in agreements with the terms of the interview. The member checking strategy
supported quality by obtaining the reaffirmation of the participants. The interviews did
not contain system-specific or vulnerability-specific questions to avoid endangering the
participant’s organization. These safeguards mitigated ethical concerns and ensured that
the beneficence of this research outweighs the risks.
Treatment of data. Privacy and confidentiality are two important ethical
concerns. I signed the confidentiality agreement assenting the responsibilities to
safeguard the confidentiality of the participants and the data. Losing data can be
detrimental to researchers and participants. If the information is lost, researchers may
have to repeat the collection process. On the other hand, sensitive information can put the
participants at risk. Creswell (2013) recommends masking the name of the participants to
ensure confidentiality. The study did not collect sensitive information. Nevertheless, the
data of the participants were stored using pseudonyms.
The research data were protected to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) cautioned that researchers who do not
take advantage of available technology would be disadvantaged in contrast with those
who avail of available technology. Unfortunately, technology is subject to system failures
and theft. Creswell (2013) recommends creating backups of the research data. Backups
and cloud storage solutions are excellent strategies to ensure availability against data loss.
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Google Drive was used as a cloud storage solution to help prevent data loss and allow
access from anywhere in the world.
The data were stored on a personal computer and replicated into Google Drive.
The computer was password protected, and the data were stored on an encrypted hard
drive. The data replicated to Google Drive is secured using 2-step verification. This
process requires a combination of username, password, and verification code (Google,
n.d.). The verification code can only be received or generated by my phone. If the
username and password are compromised, the attacker cannot access the information due
to the missing verification code.
Raw data were not disseminated to any third party. Only the participants and I
could access to raw data. During the member checking process, the results were shared
with the respective participants for validation and feedback. The Dissertation Supervisory
Committee could have access to the data to ensure the trustworthiness of the data
collection, analysis, and interpretation after signing a confidentiality agreement. The final
dissertation will be published in ProQuest upon receiving the approval of the University.
I will attempt to disseminate the final research by publishing the investigation in
scholarly journals. Since the research will not include sensitive information, the data will
be kept for at least five years.
Summary
The research design provided the means to explore and understand the
cybersecurity posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico. The design was based on the
principles of phenomenology as a research tradition with a transcendental approach.
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Transcendental phenomenology provided the scholarly structure for exploring, collecting,
organizing, analyzing, and presenting information about cybersecurity postures during
the research process. This phenomenological approach took advantage of researchers as
the primary data collection tool.
I performed as a participant observer and did not have any relationship with the
participants. The population consisted of public servants, while the sample consisted of
public servants acting in IT leadership roles in municipal government within Puerto Rico.
The study concentrated in highly populated municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina
– Caguas MSA. It is expected that these municipalities had a more complex infrastructure
and a higher dependency on IT systems. Part of the criterion was for the participants to
have at least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon to guarantee an adequate level
of experience and offer relevant data. Phenomenological studies could include up to 25
participants (Creswell, 2013). However, the larger the sample size, the shorter the depth
of the research. The study consisted of a sample size of 10 participants to concentrate on
gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.
According to Creswell (2013), phenomenological studies rely mainly on interview
data. Analyzing interviews from different participants could lead to the finding of shared
or similar experiences that may be significant to address the research problem. This study
used a researcher-developed data collection instrument consisting of in-depth face-to-face
interviews following a semistructured protocol. This approach enabled participants to
describe the essence of their experiences with cyber threats.
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The data analysis plan leveraged the use of technological resources including
NVivo, Google Drive, as well as other general software. NVivo served as the qualitative
data analysis software for the organization, analysis, interpretation, and visualization of
the data. Google Drive was used as the secure cloud solution for storing all the research
data. The coding and them strategies consisted of a combination of predetermined and
emerging elements. Predetermined codes emerged from the literature and the conceptual
framework of the study. Emerging elements arose during the data analysis process.
The trustworthiness of the study was supported by validation strategies such as
clarifying research bias, member checking, and external audits. Researcher biases were
managed through bracketing. This process allowed me to provide an insight of my
experiences with the phenomenon to support objectivity and the use of intuition which is
fundamental to transcendental phenomenology. Member checking was used to share the
results of the findings with each of the participants. Also, the Dissertation Supervisory
Committee composed of a content expert, methodology experts, and URR served as the
external auditor to the process and related process.
The ethical procedures included using a Research Ethics Planning Worksheet to
identify and address possible ethical concerns. Further, an Application for Research
Ethics Review was submitted to the IRB to ensured that the research met ethic
requirements and aligned with the University’s ethical standards and applicable ethical
regulations. Participation in the study was voluntary and confidential. Participants were
required to complete consent forms to participate in the research. Further, the research
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data were safeguarded through the implementation of administrative, operational, and
technical controls to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The next chapter included an overview of the outcome of the study. During
Chapter 4, research elements such as the setting, data collection and analysis, evidence of
trustworthiness, and results were described. Chapter 4 provided a thick description of the
performed research methodology and its alignment to the research design described
during this chapter. These descriptions supported the transferability of the findings by
providing enough information for readers to determine if the results could be transferable
to their knowledge settings. Also, deviations to the proposed methodology were
explained and justified as part of the upcoming chapter.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of
municipal governments from the perception of public servants serving in IT leadership
roles in Puerto Rico. The principal factors affecting the cybersecurity posture of
municipal governments were also addressed as part of the study. A phenomenological
approach was used to address the knowledge gap about this problem. This approach
focused on the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases.
Two qualitative research questions guided the study. These research questions
addressed the perceptions of IT leaders’ regarding the phenomenon of inquiry. The first
research question addressed how public servants in IT leadership roles perceived the
cybersecurity posture of local government municipalities in Puerto Rico. The second
question addressed the factors that public servants in IT leadership roles perceived to be
most influential in achieving a resilient cybersecurity posture.
The research methodology did not include a pilot study. Also, demographic data
were not collected to safeguard the confidentiality of the participants. The sections of this
chapter include the results of the study related to the purpose and research questions. This
chapter also covers other related research elements such as the setting, data collection,
data analysis, and trustworthiness of the data. This chapter offers a thick description of
these research elements. Further, deviations from the original methodology are explained
and justified.
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Research Setting
The research setting encompassed highly populated municipalities within the San
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. This organizational condition of highly populated
municipalities required managing budgets, services, and information resources in
alignment with the size of the population. These conditions had a positive influence on
the participants to support their development as information-rich cases. Other conditions
that could have influenced the experiences of the participants with cybersecurity
participants were political changes, fiscal situation, and natural disasters.
After the 2016 election in Puerto Rico, the political leadership administering the
targeted municipalities remained unchanged. However, in June of 2017, the mayor of
Guaynabo resigned from his position (Suarez-Torres, 2017). After a new election, a new
mayor from the same political party was elected having minimum impact on the
participants. This condition provided continuity of operation for the participants
performing in IT leadership roles within the municipalities.
The fiscal crisis also affected the participants and their organizations. Since
January 2017, the oversight board established by the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) of 2016 was responsible for
approving fiscal plans and budgets as well as requesting their revision and enforcing
requirements upon them. The government budget had been reduced, directly affecting the
targeted municipalities and their IT operations.
Another significant factor affecting the participants and their experiences was the
aftermath of hurricane Maria. In September 2017, a Category 5 hurricane devastated
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Puerto Rico leaving its critical infrastructures such as the telecommunications, power
grid, and water and wastewater systems inoperable. Most of the municipalities that
participated in this study spent an average of 3 months without electricity. This situation
increased the participants’ experience in disaster recovery efforts supporting the
availability of their systems. The situation also limited the availability of the participants
in these municipalities. Participants in the municipalities of Toa Baja and Toa Alta were
planned to be part of the study, but they could not be reached due to the lack of electrical
power and problems with telecommunications after hurricane Maria.
Data Collection
The data collection process started on May 7 and lasted until May 18 of 2018.
During the recruitment process, 10 public servants working in an IT leadership role in a
municipal setting in Puerto Rico were invited to participate in the study. A total of 10
public servants agreed to participate in the study. The municipalities that took part in the
data collection were San Juan, Bayamon, Carolina, Caguas, and Guaynabo. A
combination of field notes and audio recordings was used to collect the data. The data
collection process was performed during face-to-face interviews with the participants.
The interviews took place at the participants’ place of work. Seven of the
participants were interviewed in private offices. Three participants were interviewed in
conference rooms. Both the offices and the conference rooms offered security and
privacy to the participants. The frequency of the interviews was limited to one session.
The duration of the sessions lasted an average of 1 hour. Before the interviews, 10-minute
briefings were performed to describe the study and the conditions. After the initial
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briefing, the session advanced to the interviews, which lasted an average of 45 minutes.
Each interview was followed by a 10-minute debrief to answer any questions from the
participant and to explain the next steps in the process.
During the interviews, I wrote field notes in a notepad. With the consent of the
participants, the interviews were recorded. The primary method for the audio recording
was a smartphone application named Audio Recorder, which was developed by Sony
under the Android Open Source Project. A second recording device was used as a backup
to the smartphone application. The secondary device was a Yemenren 8GB Sound Audio
Recorder Dictaphone.
Three minor deviations transpired from the data collection plan presented in
Chapter 3. The first deviation was capturing the field notes in a notepad instead of in a
digital format using a computer. The notepad was less distracting and helped to foster a
better interpersonal connection with the participant. The second deviation was drafting
mind maps during the interviews. Mind maps were not used during data collection
because the process reduced emphasis on from the interview. Instead, the emphasis was
placed on the field notes, which were crucial to developing probing questions using the
participant’s examples. The third deviation was two of the eight interviews were not oneon-one. Due to lack of time and conflicting priorities, one interview was scheduled with
two participants at the same time. The person in the primary leadership role served as the
primary participant and the second person performed a supporting role to provide
additional information.
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Data Analysis
After collecting the data, I used a text-based toolkit product named Trint to
transcribe the audio recording. I reviewed the transcripts for quality and mechanics.
Then, I translated the transcripts from Spanish to English and entered into NVivo. Two
deviations from the original data analysis plan occurred. The first deviation was not using
NVivo’s pattern-based automatic coding because this capability was in an experimental
stage and could have affected the trustworthiness of the study. The second deviation was
the use of structural description. This description requires deep insight from the
participants that could lead to their identification, and the study was designed to keep the
identity of the participants confidential. Beyond these deviations, the data analysis was
performed according to the plan. The data analysis followed a phenomenological
approach consisting of horizontalization, reduction and elimination, clustering and
thematizing, validation, and individual and composite textural descriptions. Each phase
was recorded in NVivo as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Data analysis phases documented in NVivo. This figure illustrates the
phenomenological data analysis phases as documented in NVivo qualitative data analysis
software.

During the horizontalization phase, all of the relevant experiences about
cybersecurity expressed during the interview were identified. The experiences were given
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equal importance. I noticed a connection between the participants’ experience and the
security controls listed by NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations, particularly regarding the controls required for
low impact systems. A total of 106 items emerged as part of the initial coding process.
The second phase consisted of reduction and elimination. The 106 codes were
reviewed to validate that the experience was necessary for the understanding of the
phenomena. During the reduction process, the initial codes were grouped into meaning
units (see Creswell, 2013). The second step was the process of elimination. During this
process, the codes were reviewed taking into consideration possible overlaps, repetition,
and vagueness. Through the processes of reduction and elimination, the codes were
reduced to 58 codes, almost half of the initial coding.
The next phase of the data analysis was clustering and thematization. During this
phase, meaning units were clustered into broad units of information or themes (see
Creswell, 2013). As explained in Chapter 3, the codes included a combination of
predetermined and emerging codes describing ideas related to the experiences of the IT
leaders and the essence of the cybersecurity posture. The codes were analyzed to align
with Creswell’s (2013) recommendation of five to seven themes. The first six themes
were aligned with RQ2 and the dimensions of the conceptual framework. These codes
included general, institutional, collaboration, organizational, data, and technology
dimensions. The seventh code emerged later in the process and was aligned with RQ1
and was labeled as posture. Another theme was created to capture administrative data
such as memorable quotes. All of the emerging themes were within the scope of the
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conceptual framework’s dimensions and were clustered as subthemes under the
applicable domain. With the additions, the codes increased from 58 to 66.
The fourth phase was validating the codes and themes. I followed three steps
recommended by Moustakas (1994):
•

Are codes and themes expressed explicitly in the complete transcription?

•

Are codes and themes compatible if not explicitly expressed?

•

Delete not explicit or compatible codes and themes.

Based on the guidance from Moustakas (1994), I removed not explicit codes and
themes. The codes that were identified as not compatible but valid to the study were
moved to compatible nodes. Those identified as not compatible with the study were
deleted. During the validation phase, the themes were aligned with the cybersecurityrelated areas listed in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 200, Minimum
Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems, rather than
individual security controls. Table 2 shows an overview of FIPS 200 cybersecurityrelated areas referenced by the participants as information-rich cases. After the validation
phase, the total nodes were narrowed to 46.
The next step in the process was the development of individual textural
descriptions. Using NVivo, I aligned the initial data file containing the interview
transcripts with the coding of meaning and broad units of information as the foundation
for the textural descriptions. These textural descriptions were incorporated into
comprehensive passages known as a composite description representing the experience of
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the participants as a whole. The composite description was used as the content for the
study results. My interpretation of the composite description is presented in Chapter 5.
Table 2
Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements Areas Referenced by Participants
Cybersecurity-Related Areas
Access Control
Awareness and Training
Audit and Accountability
Certification, Accreditation,
and Security Assessments
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning

Referenced
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Identification and
Authentication

No

Incident Response

Yes

Cybersecurity-Related Areas
Media Protection
Physical and Environmental
Protection
Planning
Personnel Security

Referenced
No
Yes
No
No

Risk Assessment
System and Services
Acquisition
System and Communications
Protection

Yes
Yes

System and Information
Integrity

Yes

Yes

Maintenance
No
Note. Cybersecurity-related areas were adapted from the Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information
Systems.

Discrepant cases were managed as part of reduction and elimination, clustering
and thematizing, and validation. The cases were tested during the reduction and
elimination to validate relevance and labeling. The discrepant cases that were relevant but
not aligned to existing codes emerged as new labels. A similar approach was followed
during the clustering and thematizing phases. During the validation phase, all of the
nodes were validated following Moustakas’s (1994) validation strategy.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The documents used to support the research were peered reviewed or originated
from reliable sources such as government agencies. The participants were public servants
in IT leadership roles who had experienced the phenomenon. A member checking
technique was used to support credibility and validate the analysis, interpretations, and
conclusions. A summary of the results with the key themes was emailed to the
participants. The intent was for the participants to provide reassurance of the results and
identify possible gaps or misconceptions. The participants did not report discrepancies
with the results. The deviations to the strategies presented in Chapter 3 were explained
and justified as part of the Data Collection and Data Analysis sections.
Transferability
The literature review was presented in Chapter 2 with references to all of the
artifacts reviewed during the process. Chapter 3 provided a thick description of the
methodology to facilitate the replication the study in another setting. This chapter
provided a thick description of the settings, codes, themes, and other characteristics as a
means for readers to determine the transferability of the findings to other settings. The
deviations were discussed in the Data Collection and Data Analysis sections and should
have no significant impact on the transferability of the study.
Dependability
The dependability of the research is supported through audit trails, including
artifacts documenting the identification of the problem, prospectus, literature review,
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research design, data collection instrument and evidence of the collection, data analysis,
and interpretation of the findings. The identification of the research problem as well as
preliminary frameworks, designs, and methodologies were captured in a historical
alignment tool. A prospectus outlining the problem, purpose, research questions, and an
overview of the research design, framework and methodology were approved before
starting the research. The approved data collection instrument is in Appendix B. The data
collection audit trail includes audio files, transcript, and translated transcript that are
stored as data files in an NVivo project. This strategy supports dependability by allowing
cross-referencing the different data sources used in the research.
Confirmability
The research design included bracketing as a form of reflexivity to avoid biases.
In addition to bracketing, Creswell (2013) mentioned that auditing could be used to
support confirmability. Similar to the approached described in the Dependability section,
each phase of the data analysis is documented in individual folders inside the Codes
sections of the NVivo project, including a folder for retired and combined nodes as
documented in Figure 5. The folders are linked to memos with insight on the process.
The individual and composite textural descriptions are documented in memos within
NVivo. Also, the mind map and visual representation of the results were developed using
NVivo. The Dissertation Supervisory Committee and the URR served as the auditors for
the overall trustworthiness of the research. These strategies provided confirmability by
clarifying research bias, suspending prejudgments, and maintaining objectivity.
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Bracketing
I have 17 years of experience with cybersecurity at the federal government level
while performing in different roles ranging from a system administrator to the
information system security manager. Between 2014 and 2016, I was responsible for the
cybersecurity of a national system that interconnected with 46 state-level systems. During
this time, I was exposed to the posture of various states and local governments. Their
posture was not mature which led to several collaboration initiatives to raise awareness
and help improve their posture. The initiates included webinar and conferences as well as
establishing minimum security controls, assessment of the controls, as well as developing
federal regulation to mandate the use of information security agreements. These
experiences could have contributed to biases against the posture of the local government.
The Data Collection, Data Analysis, and Evidence of Trustworthiness sections on this
chapter included some of the mechanisms used to counteract possible biases. Outside the
research design, my personal experience during the research was contrary to any bias as it
driven by curiosity and interest in participants' perception of the phenomenon.
Study Results
The results were organized in the predetermined and emerging codes discovered
during the data analyses process. The results include quotes from transcripts and data
visualization such as mind maps and hierarchy charts developed in NVivo to illustrate the
results. The results start with a section titled Posture which answered RQ1. The
remaining sections are associated with RQ2. Figure 6 shows a summary of the primary
elements affecting the local government’s cybersecurity posture discovered in the study.
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Figure 6. Mind map of dimensions and elements influencing digital government. This figure
illustrates the dimensions that were part of the contextual framework of the research methodology
in alignment with the elements identified as part of the results of the study as influential factors to
the local government cybersecurity posture.

Posture
The participants perceived the posture of their municipality as resilient. P-3
stated, “on a scale of 1 to 5; I would say that we are a 4.” Meanwhile, P-4 used the results
from the comptroller’s IT audit as a resiliency measurement where the municipalities
with a low score “should not be very protected and that possibly they do not have the
tools or processes to work with cybersecurity.” The participants agreed that their
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municipalities are more secure because of their ability to implement mature processes.
Figure 7 shows the Organizational Structure and Processes as the most relevant
dimension supporting the posture of the municipal government.
Outside their municipalities, the participants talked about the posture of federal
and state government as an influential factor to their own. These postures were captured
as part of the Institutional Framework as identified in Figure 7. However, most of the
data were about how this dimension is failing to provide the conditions to support
cybersecurity. P-3 described the federal government as stringent while the state was
seemed as flexible with cybersecurity. P-8 revealed using stricter processes to protect
health data due to federal requirements. P-3 said that insularism prevents the state from
seeing “what happens in the world of cyberattacks and we are alienated from our political
relationship with the United States where things that affect them will eventually affect
us.” P-6 said that most incidents happened at the state and summarized the overall
posture as “some agencies give more love to cybersecurity than others.”
The participants identified the information and technology dimensions as critical
supporting elements. P-2 expressed feeling “safe with the technologies that we have in
place.” P-3 pointed to technology as the reason they can provide the same services as
other municipalities, but with more accessibility, efficiency, and security while
recognizing that technology alone does not make them invulnerable. P-7 considered
technologies and processes among other elements, to be of equal value stating, “I
understand that all the factors are equally important because if you implement one thing
without implementing the other, you will not reach a resilient posture.” P-1 mentioned,
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“there is always room for improvement” and is confident that “little by little” the posture
can be improved. The rest of the participants also acknowledged having areas to improve.

Figure 7. Hierarchy chart of dimensions and elements supporting cybersecurity. This figure
provides a hierarchical view of the dimension and element, and their influence on the local
government cybersecurity posture. The bigger the area, the more relevant to the posture.

General Context
The general context dimension encompassed the external factors affecting the
cybersecurity posture of the municipalities. These factors were identified by the
participants as changes in technology, economic situation, political agendas, and the
interest of the private sector.
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Technological change. As seen in Figure 7, the participants identified
technological change as the general context element with the most significant impact on
their posture as it encompasses multiple threats and challenges. P-3 explained that IT
services have evolved from one office with a system and dedicated administrator into
multiple systems, networks, and teams devoted to supporting a vast range of IT services.
P-1 explained:
The Internet has been around for many years, but the access to it has increased,
and with higher bandwidth and increased in services there is more exposure. That
transition led the municipality to provide online services, but there is no education
about the risks.
P-1, P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-7 agreed that cybersecurity is an ever-changing domain.
P-5 stated, “policies change, security changes, viruses, and attacks change.” P-4
recognized that business processes are mobility and data-driven and recommended
adopting cloud technologies to address some of the challenges. However, P-7 warned
about the risks and exposure of cloud service providers to frequent attacks and explained
that attackers prefer targets that will give them more data and reputation versus a
municipality.
P-5 explained that instead of technical knowledge attackers are relying on scripts,
tools, and the Internet to execute attacks. P-1 stated, “organizations believe that they will
not be victims of cyberattacks because their data are not of interest.” P-5 warned about
attacks designed to lure users through phishing emails, website spoofing, and rogue
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wireless hotspots. P-1 affirmed that attacks like ransomware “encrypt social security and
credit card information in the same way that will encrypt nonconfidential information.”
P-7 stated, “you block one thing, and half an hour later you are being attacked by
other means because hackers are always looking for ways to do damage.” P-6 said, “I can
buy a great appliance, but there is already a hacker trying to compromise the system.” P-8
agreed and stated, “if you stay behind it will be much easier for someone to attack you.”
P-4 stated, “a lot of people out there trying to enter and get information. Therefore, what
worries me the most is not knowing what is happening?” P-4 cited Murphy's Law and
advised being vigilant even when nothing seems to be happening.
Economy. P-1, P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7 highlighted the fiscal situation as an
element affecting the availability of resources. P-6 stated:
The municipalities of Puerto Rico economically are not well. Before the
hurricane, I went to another municipality where for economic reasons employees
only worked half-days. If they do not have a budget and their employees work
half-days, they will not have money to purchase cybersecurity equipment.
P-3 identified PROMESA as one of the factors affecting the government’s budget.
The situation has also affected the staff as P-6 said, “some employees are very committed
and others who are disgruntled because they have not had salary increases, bonuses were
eliminated, and sick days were reduced.” P-3 believes that the government should not
“use money as an excuse to do not do the things that must be done. We must do things
well, ethically, morally, and legally regardless of whether there is money or not.”
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Politics. P-3 mentioned that diverse political ideologies could turn into fanaticism
affecting operations and services. P-7 considered that having 78 municipalities nourish
division and repetition. Several participants agreed and endorsed consolidation strategies.
Each municipality has a data center to what P-6 asked: “Why do we need so many data
centers providing the same services?” P-6 uses the private sector as an example of data
center consolidation to reduce cost and identified politics as the main obstacle. However,
P-6 stated, “If I try to consolidate using my data center, the municipalities of the opposite
political party will not agree.” P-5 mentioned that politics has also affected
interoperability and explained that during hurricane Maria, the government was using
different frequencies instead of a standard emergency channel.
Private sector interest. P-5 mentioned that private sector interest leads to
recommending products that are not the best for the municipality with the intention of
making a profit or taking out the competitor. According to P-5, these interests expand to
the telecommunication services where private entities after buying other companies had
broken preestablished agreements preventing the reuse of relay towers by other providers
resulting in a degraded infrastructure. P-5 and P-8 revealed that providers are not diligent
with resolving outages, often taking days to fix them. P-8 described the
telecommunication market as a monopoly.
Institutional Framework
The participants gave a similar value to federal governance, standard, and internal
policies as evidenced in Figure 7. These elements were identified as important, but not as
current influential factors. For instance, P-8 indicated complying with the Health
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. On the other hand, most
participants expressed a lack of familiarity with federal policies and international
standards such as those developed by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). P-4 mentioned that
federal guidelines are useful and more accessible than the ones provided by the state. P-5
recognized the importance of following these guidelines but explained that the
municipalities only follow the comptroller’s guidance which does not include federal or
international requirements. According to P-6, not having a federal point of contact is a
challenge to the voluntary adoption of federal guidelines. Regarding internal policies, P-3
revealed that the municipality has just an ordinance that regulates the use of information
systems. P-5 recommended developing and implementing municipal policies that are
more detailed than the state governance.
The municipalities are subject to the E-Government Act of 2004, TIGs, and
circulars. P-3, P-6, and P-5 agreed that the state has failed to enforce compliance with the
policies. P-5 stated, “If you have a law and you do not explain its use and not enforce it
the law is just written on paper.” P-4 and P-6 mentioned that the comptroller performs IT
audits, but these are done infrequently. Also, P-5 and P-7 explained that the audits have
no clear scope, plans, nor metrics. P-1 mentioned that often people learn of the
requirements after an incident has occurred. P-5 and P-7 provided examples of findings
from undefined requirements and explained that could have been addressed earlier if the
requirements were clearly defined. P-5 acknowledged that ignorance is not an exemption,
but points to lack of training and communication as the problem.
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P-5 and P-8 agreed that policies must be established by the state without political
interest while leveraging standards and ensuring enforcement. P-8 recommended making
the circulars mandatory and explained, “improving legislation will force entities to follow
an operational standard.” P-2 described the policies as “quite complete.” However, the
rest of the participants contended that the policies are general and up for interpretation.
The participants affirmed that the circulars are not practical nor readily accessible, the
format requires analysis to understand changes and applicability, and without proper
communication, the requirements can be lost. P-7 recommended establishing a living
policy that is accessible and updated as new requirements are enacted.
In addition to the comptroller, the government established the CIO of Puerto Rico.
P-6 and P-7 mentioned that the CIO is supposed to be watching over the entire
government instead of just focusing on state agencies. P-7 affirmed that the CIO should
be responsible for reaching out to the municipalities to understand the factors affecting
their cybersecurity posture, develop solutions, and foster collaboration and information
sharing. P-6 and P-7 identified information sharing as an area needing improvement,
citing examples of state agencies that have been hacked. P-7 stated, “If we continue with
the same concept of 78 municipalities and numerous government agencies where each
one is doing something different, there are knowledge and experiences that are being
lost.” The lessons learned are crucial to prevent future attacks. P-8 revealed that the state
is legislating to empower the CIO to implement requirements across the government.

113
Interorganizational Collaboration and Networks
According to P-6, “collaboration does not exist much in Puerto Rico.” Similarly,
P-7 expressed, “the culture of collaboration does not exist.” Figure 7 shows
interorganizational collaboration as the second lowest relevant dimension. The
participants mentioned that collaboration with the federal and state government was
limited to emergency response or other compulsory conditions. P-1 and P-2 experienced
collaboration as part of system interconnection efforts. P-2 stated, “It sounds nice, like we
can work together, but is a matter of cybersecurity defense rather than genuine
collaboration.” Nevertheless, most of the participants recognized the lack of collaboration
as a negative factor and expressed their wiliness to collaborate.
P-3, P-4, and P-7 identified emergencies as collaboration opportunities. P-7
revealed that most municipalities “do not have the budget to have a disaster recovery
center, and after the hurricane, their fiscal situation is worse.” P-7 recommended
establishing agreements to receive essential IT services from the municipalities proven to
withstand a hurricane. Also, P-3 shared being part of a coalition of municipalities and
stated, “the economic resources needed to maintain cybersecurity are too high, and in this
coalition, we help each other.” Regarding the private sector, collaboration was limited to
service contracts. P-4 planned to benchmark processes and technologies with public and
private entities and affirmed that these enhancements could not be achieved in isolation.
Organizational Structures and Processes
Contrary to the general context dimension the organizational structures and
processes encompassed the internal elements of the organization. These elements are
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related to the organization’s ability to defend and protect against cyber threats. As shown
in Figure 7, the organizational structure and processes dimension was identified as the
most influential dimension to support resilient cybersecurity posture.
Structure. The participants identified centralization as the most effective
structure to manage cybersecurity but agreed that the structure should be tied to the size,
type, resources, and complexity of the organization. From a technical view, P-5 and P-8
justified centralization to secure and monitor the network and communication routes. P-2
stated, “every agency should have one person in charge of cybersecurity.” However, P-1
and P-7 affirmed that most agencies do not have a dedicated role. P-3 and P-5 explained
that the IT office is divided into areas with cybersecurity as an additional function. P-7
stated, “this role is assigned to someone who already has another pile of things to do.
Therefore, you do not have a person with a clear mind to focus on this topic.” P-1
identified the network engineer as the person usually performing this role.
Culture. P-1 stated, “cybersecurity is taken very lightly, I do not think it is looked
with the attention it deserves.” P-1 shared working at organizations where “cybersecurity
is done to check the block and say that there is something in place.” P-7 affirmed that the
concept of cybersecurity is new and is not part of the culture. P-2 mentioned, “people are
resistant to change, especially when is related to technology.” P-5 explained that users
still writing their passwords and keeping them under the keyboard and does not give
credit to IT staff unless a system is down. P-4 agreed and described cybersecurity
professionals as silent heroes working to prevent incidents. However, cybersecurity
professionals are seen as bad guys for restricting access. P-4 stated:
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I am one of the least popular people because one of the first things I did was
implementing password controls such as password expiration and complexity. I
still am a persona non grata because later I reduced access to the Internet and
social media.
Management support and resources. Figure 7 identified management support as
one of the most relevant elements in the study. Participants agreed that management's
commitment is an influential factor, because managers are responsible for assigning
resources. P-3, P-4, P-6, and P-8 shared having a good experience with management. P-6
described management as “pro-technology” and “very tech-savvy.” P-4 stated:
Management support has been good at supporting cybersecurity. Whenever we
have asked for a budget, management has seen the importance and are aware of
the need for investment. That is why we have been able to maintain good
programs and resources.
However, P-3 described as difficult explaining to management why a system that
is functional is no longer supported and must be replaced. P-1 explained, “cybersecurity
is not seen as something that will bring a return on Investment (ROI), especially when in
the last 10 years nothing has happened” P-3 and P-5 recommended presenting cost
reductions, service improvement, operational enhancements, and tradeoff as ROI. P-3
pointed at virtualization as an alternative to reduce cost by turning old computers into
thin clients. P-2 recommended, “projects that can be subdivided into blocks that can be
carried out over several years.” P-7 stated, “to have the best employees you cannot offer

116
the worst salaries” and shared an initiative that has saved around 20 million dollars in the
last 10 years by hiring staff with the proper skills and compensation.
Processes. Participants shared a vast experience of organizational processes. As
evidenced in Figure 7, processes were identified as the most relevant element supporting
the cybersecurity. Figure 8 provides a closer look at the list of procedures that were
identified by the participants as key to support their cybersecurity posture.
Access control. Processes like account management made of access control the
third most relevant procedure and one of the most significant elements of the
organizational structure and process dimension. P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7, and P-8 shared similar
account management procedures where new staff agrees to the system use policy, and a
copy of the agreement is kept in a file. P-5 uses system use notification banners to remind
users of the conditions in the use policy. For calls related to password, P-5 requires
identity verification consisting of security questions, supervisor validation, or a valid
identification. P-5 and P-8 mentioned disabling the accounts of users on extended leave
or those no longer with the agency. Most participants confirmed using role-based controls
to configure access based on the user’s responsibilities. P-8 says the goal is to make it
hard for a disgruntled employee and external attackers to be successful. P-5 and P-8
mentioned that only administrators have privileged access to the systems. P-4 and P-5
identified separation of duties as a deficiency explaining that some administrators have
the same access because of the need to be each other’s alternate to ensure coverage.
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Figure 8. Hierarchy chart of processes supporting cybersecurity. This figure provides a
hierarchical view of the key process and subprocess, and their influence on the readiness of the
organizational structures and processes dimension. The bigger the area, the more relevant to the
posture.

Configuration management. P-2, P-5, and P-8 perform configuration
management over open ports/protocols/services to ensure that these are closed by default
and allowed by exception. P-1 recommended introducing cybersecurity at the beginning
of the system development lifecycle by including minimum requirements such as secure
protocols, encryption, and network segmentation. P-4 emphasized the proper
configuration of security tools to take advantage of all of their protection capabilities. P5, P-6, and P-7 mentioned that removable media ports are blocked by default and allowed
through an approval process. P-3 and P-7 are proponents of the thin clients configured
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with least functionality. P-5 mentioned using media access control address filtering to
control access to the wireless network.
Contingency planning. The frequent exposure to hurricanes and the recent
experience with hurricane Maria made of contingency planning the most relevant
process. P-1 described the experience with hurricane Maria as “frightening” and
identified contingency planning as the number one priority. Figure 8 describes the
relevance of contingency planning and its related elements in comparison with the other
processes. P-8 explained, “when hurricane Maria struck, Puerto Rico was without
electricity and other services, but the municipality was operational.” The contingency
plans were key to the success of their continuity of operations. Figure 9 shows a mind
map of the processes and contingency planning subcomponents identified in the study.
Contingency training and testing. P-4, P-5, P-7, and P-8 advised testing and
reviewing contingency plans as well as related sites and systems. P-7 acknowledged that
the contingency efforts failed and incorporated testing to avoid future incidents. P-5
shared a situation in which change was made, but not replicated on the alternate site, and
the monitoring tools did not identify the discrepancy. However, during a testing exercise,
the situation was discovered and corrected. P-5 also recommended stress testing stating,
“if you do not do the simulation, you will not know if the system will be available.” P-5
affirmed that testing for availability is as necessary as any other test.
Alternate sites. P-3 affirmed not having “all the eggs in one basket” as their
strategy included alternate site, redundant data, and voice with different providers. The
participants shared having alternate storage and processing sites as well as performing
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data replication. P-4 uses a hybrid cloud colocation, P-6’s alternate site includes a
workspace, and P-8 mentioned having two data centers with mirrored equipment to serve
as each other alternate. P-3 mentioned that virtualization help contingency efforts as
systems could be deployed and accessed from anyplace with Internet access.

Figure 9. Mind map of key processes supporting cybersecurity. This figure illustrates the key
processes and subprocess supporting the cybersecurity posture of the local government and their
relationship.

Telecommunications services. P-4 discovered the difference between critical
assets during normal operations and a time of crisis and identified telecommunications as
the most critical assets. P-5 explained, “if the telecommunications go down, not only did
you lose the data, you also lost your voice and you were left without communications
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unless you have redundancy.” P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6 mentioned having redundant
network connections using fiber optic and wireless with different providers.
System backups. P-7 stated, “is very important to have good backups because it is
the only thing that can guarantee that you can return your systems to a given point in time
in case of an attack or natural disaster.” Most participants mentioned their system backup
strategy includes backing up critical systems more often in addition to scheduling tape
rotation between internal and external archives.
Incident response. P-3, P-4, and P-7 revealed being affected by ransomware. P-4
explained that while recovering from a blackout “someone notified us that he could not
access his data, but we understood that it was part of the recovery process, but it was
ransomware.” The root-cause analysis pointed to a computer used for constituents to
upload documents. As part of the lessons learned, P-4 established controls to prevent
executables files while allowing formats required for the services. P-3 and P-4 were able
to recover using their backups. In the case of P-7, the incident happened at a thin client,
and instead of paying the ransom P-7’s team restored the system to the previous day.
Physical and environmental protection. According to P-4, cloud service
providers have everything necessary to operate out of the grid for months. Outsourcing
those services prevented investing in the systems to support those conditions. P-5’s
alternate site can operate for 30 days disconnected from the grid. The site consists of
redundant water tanks, power generators, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, and
uninterruptible power source batteries. P-8 also shared having redundant power
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generators and batteries. P-5 mentioned using security cameras, closed cabinets, access
cards, in addition to access logs, and limited physical access to key personnel.
Risk assessment. P-4 mentioned that data must be protected based on their risk
and identified financial and PII data as the priority. P-4 explained that public information
also needs to be protected to avoid its release outside established protocols. P-3, P-5, and
P-7 expressed that often the personnel responsible for cybersecurity are not experts, and
outsourcing external assessments such as penetration testing are crucial to validate the
security controls. P-5 and P-8 recommended performing risk assessments at least twice a
year. P-7 mentioned that the comptroller requires external assessments, but the fiscal
situation is an obstacle to justifying the cost.
System and information integrity. The participants acknowledged using a
centralized approach to managed malicious code protection and vulnerability scans. P-3
and P-4 stressed that most security solutions are reactive and used the antivirus as an
example that protects against known threats and could leave the organization vulnerable
to new threats. The situation increased the importance of performing vulnerability
management to correct systems flaws. P-1 described vulnerability management as a
recurrent task. P-5 and P-7 use a patch management system to install security updates. P7 uses manual patching for servers to safeguard their availability. P-5 uses network
access control to block or update computers out of compliance.
System and services acquisition. P-3, P-4, and P-8 recommended outsourcing
technical support to ensure access to expert advice. P-5 and P-7 recommended including
training vouchers as part of contracts to cover the technologies used by the municipality.
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P-3 explained that technology changes so fast that is hard to keep staff up to date,
whereas outsource services places the responsibility of training staff on the provider. P-4
recommended leveraging technologies that offer security, continuity, and redundancy. P5 and P-8 recommended auctions and negotiation as vehicles to lower cost. Through
negotiation, P-5 achieved cost saving of 50% less than what the state government pays
for the same service. P-8 promoted centralized procurements to get wholesale prices. P-5
recommended including financial penalties as part of the service level agreement to
prevent extended outages based on the provider’s lack of responsiveness.
Information and Data
The information and data dimension was identified as the second most relevant to
cybersecurity. This dimension was accredited by the participants as a fundamental input
to support the organizational structure and processes dimension and related elements.
Figure 7 displays the hierarchical position and the equal relevance of its elements.
Awareness and training management. Most participants use a combination of
classroom, online, and external training to support SETA programs. P-4 explained that
raising awareness can be as simple as sending an email but explained that it is not an easy
task for technicians and recommended working with human resources (HR) to achieve a
user-friendly format. P-5 mentioned that since HR is required by the comptroller to
provide training, P-5 leverage the training for IT purposes. As low-cost alternatives, P-3
and P-5 recommended the using experienced employees in conjunction with a train the
trainer model. P-5 also recommended developing user manuals as part of system
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implementations that can be used for training. P-3 suggested a reimbursement option for
dependencies to cover some of the costs. P-7 recommended the use of free tutorials.
As part of SETA programs, P-4, P-5, and P-7 advocated for continuing education
(CE). P-7 described CE as a mutual commitment where the staff commits to study, and
the employer provides the resources. P-7 included CE as part of the position's description
but shared that HR was not used to the requirements. P-7 stated, “these requirements are
needed as a tool for development and as an evaluation criterion that gives us an element
that I can put in your evaluation.” P-7 also mentioned that the government does not see
CE as an investment for IT professionals as it does for other professions. P-7 affirmed
that it is hard to get a budget for CE, but CE is what provides the staff with the
knowledge to do their jobs. P-7 explained, "the Oficina de Ética Gubernamental [Office
of Government Ethics] required completing a determined amount of time every year on
ethical training” and endorsed adopting a similar approach. P-1 and P-5 identified
professional associations as a low-cost training option for CE.
Awareness training (AT). P-1 and P-4 identified users as the weakest point. P-1
recognized AT as a tool to promote awareness, strengthen commitment, and change the
culture. The participants affirmed providing AT to new employees, but none provide
recurrent training. Further, P-4 acknowledged that AT had not been given to everyone. P4 explained that security tools are doing an excellent job preventing system-targeted
attacks while user-targeted attacks are on the rise. P-7 mentioned that AT without
security controls would not guarantee following the rules, but controls without AT can
drive users to circumvent them. P-4 mentioned that users often do it unconsciously or
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based on a false sense of security by assuming that established controls will protect them.
P-4 stressed that users who were not trained should not be blamed for incidents.
P-7 explained the risk of information leakage such as PII which can be used for
identity theft. P-1 stressed the need to change “the organizational culture that believes
that because it has not happened, it will not happen.” Similarly, P-7 mentioned that most
people do not “realize the importance of cybersecurity until the day it hurts them.” P-3
and P-7 agreed on the need to remind users and management about the current threats as
well as to explain the impact these threats may have in the office and their homes. P-3 is
confident that once “the person achieves that understanding, we get them to commit and
support us.” According to P-4, “awareness will result in prevention.”
Operational information and role-based training. P-1 explained that often
cybersecurity is not taken into consideration and mentioned developers who think of
functionality instead of cybersecurity. P-3 affirmed, “the priority is to provide services
that are accessible, secure and efficient.” Therefore, cybersecurity training is crucial for
technical staff. P-4 mentioned that without CE, cybersecurity professionals could be
stuck with ineffective methods and will not be aware of new threats and mitigation. P-4
and P-6 also recommended attending conferences and collaborating with other
organizations to share methodologies and practices. P-5 provided the example of ethical
hacker training where most of the attendees, were thoughtful about their vulnerabilities
and possible remediations. P-5 stated, “you can keep public servants focused on their
work by giving them this type of knowledge and training.” P-4 proposed sending staff to
conferences to bring back information and follow-ups with the vendors as needed.
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P-1 stated, “the education is the biggest challenge, and I do not mean technical, I
am talking about upper management understanding that if we have to provide a service, it
must be secured.” P-1, P-2, and P-5 recognized that often management lacks the
knowledge about what needs to be implemented for cybersecurity. P-2 use news media to
monitor cyberattacks and understand their characteristics, impact, and mitigations. P-2
mentioned that “it sounds weird, but cyber incidents and cyberattacks are the most
influential factors to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture.” P-4 agreed with P-2 and
shared an incident that helped to increase awareness on the need for cybersecurity. P-2
recommended, “before presenting a proposal, came with a lesson to educate
management” and justify the acquisition of new technologies to support cybersecurity.
Technology
The technology dimension was identified as a key enabler. The elements in this
dimension support the element of the organizational structures and processes dimension.
This dimension was also identified as the primary line of defense to protect and defend
from the threats and challenges of the general context as well as insider threats.
Access control-technical. P-4 stated, “too many people, systems, and things
coming out every day to try to enter and get information from your network,” and
technology provides the capability to monitor the environment. P-7 identified technology
as the vehicle to enforce access controls and reduces the attack surface. P-4 considers
systems to be more reliable than users who might forget what they were taught. P-8
identified the technologies as the reason the municipality has “not suffered any
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incidents.” As part of the access management process, P-5 use technology to enforce
policies, including expiration, complexity, and history, among others.
P-7 experienced incidents where “people who get very creative and get into web
pages that they should not have, or bring a device infected with a virus.” P-4 and P-5 use
technology to enforce limited access to applications, the Internet, and social media based
on user roles. P-4 explained that users must use the solutions that the municipality can
secure. P-4 and P-7 recognized mobile devices as an area of concern as users with the
ability to configure phones and the exposure of lost or stolen devices are a risk. P-7 has a
mobile device management solution, while P-4 is testing alternatives to address the
situation as well as to provide the capabilities to implement future cost-effective
strategies such as bring your own device. As mitigation, P-4 uses an application to see the
location of the devices and performed remote erase.
System and communications protection. The participants confirmed the use of
boundary and cryptographic protection as the first line of defense, including unified
threat management, firewalls, IPS, IDS, antispam, and traffic inspection. P-8 explained
that boundary protection technologies help to enforce internal and external controls such
as the routing of data leaving or entering the network. P-4 recommended using security
layers starting with network-based at the boundary and host-based at the endpoint. P-3
and P-5 recommend the use certificates to protect websites and encrypt communications.
P-5 and P-7 mentioned that the communication of their security and network devices are
encrypted. P-5 uses demilitarized zone to restrict systems with direct access to the
Internet and avoid the exposure of the internal network.
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Summary
The central question of the study RQ1 was used to understand the perception of
the participants on the readiness of government municipalities to protect and defend
information resources. The result was of a positive connotation as participants perceived
the posture of their municipality to be resilient. The participants agreed that their
municipalities are more secure because of their ability to manage mature processes and
leveraging supporting technologies. Nevertheless, the participants recognized having
room to improve their cybersecurity program.
RQ2 focused on the elements influencing the municipal cybersecurity posture
with the intent to provide a deeper understanding of the factors enabling or hindering
their posture. The findings validated and added a layer of elements to the dimensions
influencing digital government. The institutional framework and interorganizational
collaboration dimensions failed to provide the foundation to support a resilient posture.
The organizational structures and processes dimension was discovered to be key to a
resilient posture while the elements of the information and technology dimensions were
crucial to support the organizational structures and processes.
The upcoming chapter covers the interpretation of findings, including how the
finding extended the body of knowledge and the relationship to the literature review. The
chapter also includes a description of limitations to trustworthiness. In the same way, the
chapter covered recommendations for future studies taking into consideration the
strengths and limitations of the current research. Lastly, Chapter 5 is used to describe the
potential impact for positive social change as well as the recommendations for practice.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of
municipal governments from the perceptions of public servants serving in IT leadership
roles in Puerto Rico. I also attempted to identify the primary factors influencing the
cybersecurity posture. The perception of this population originated from their lived
experiences with different cybersecurity concepts. A qualitative approach was used to
examine the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases.
The nature of this study was phenomenological. Transcendental phenomenology
was appropriate for studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities as a social
problem. Most security artifacts are protected from public release by privacy laws like
FOIA of 1966. However, individuals such as IT leaders are trustworthy and dependable
alternate data sources that can be used to study the cybersecurity posture of municipal
governments.
The central finding from the perceptions of the participants regarding the posture
of their municipalities to protect and defend information resources was resilient. The
participants pointed to the elements of organizational structures and process dimensions
as the reason why their municipalities are more secure. Regarding the elements
influencing the municipal posture, the findings added a layer to the dimensions
influencing digital government, including areas such as technological changes, politics,
economy, management support, and processes to achieve a resilient posture.
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Interpretation of Findings
The findings of the study confirmed and expanded the information presented in
the literature review. Regarding the security posture, the participants recognized that the
posture was less resilient that the federal government, but more resilient than other
municipalities and state agencies. Participants’ perception was based on the maturity of
their process and their ability to maintain technologies to support their cybersecurity
operations. The findings also confirmed the dimensions influencing digital government as
a valid framework to capture the complexity of the local government’s cybersecurity
posture. Further, analysis of the dimensions and the elements of the study from the lens
of the OST confirmed that these components are interconnected, and changes in inputs,
processes, outputs, feedback loops, and the environment can have positive or adverse
effects on other components. Figure 10 shows the theoretical and conceptual framework
as well as the results of the study to indicate the connection and influence of the different
elements starting with a political interest in favor of a resilient cybersecurity posture.
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) identified the economy, politics, and environmental
factors as outputs of the general context. According to participants in the current study,
most of these elements have a null or negative effect on their posture. For instance, the
fiscal situation has a negative effect on the municipalities’ ability to manage resources to
support cybersecurity. Saxby (2015) identified technology investments as a significant
challenge, particularly for small entities. However, economic growth by itself could have
a null effect as other elements such as cyber threats or political interest will be required to
achieve a positive response.

130

Input/Output
Feedback Loop
Association
Dimension/Element

Figure 10. Concept map of political interest influence on cybersecurity. This figure combines the
theoretical and conceptual frameworks with the results of the study to show the relationship and
influence of the different elements affecting the local government cybersecurity posture.

Cyber threats and new technologies were identified as primary technological
changes affecting cybersecurity. Kenney (2015) mentioned that attackers use similar
strategies. The participants in the current study identified ransomware, phishing emails,
and website spoofing as common strategies. Regarding the actors, Fok (2015) divided
attackers into several groups: hackers, amateurs, script kiddies, and people with technical
skills looking for “fun or notoriety” (p. 33). According to participants in the current
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study, attackers are their main threat. In addition to the threat environment, the evolution
of technology has also brought new challenges. For instance, the participants recognized
that the increased adoption of the Internet had resulted in an increased demand for online
services as well as systems to support mobility and data-driven business processes. These
systems and services increase the attack surface and exposure risk of the municipalities.
Politicians are negatively affecting cybersecurity by not recognizing it as a
priority. The political factor reflected in the finding is nourishing division, repetition, and
lack of cross-government interoperability creating additional challenges. Private sector
interest is focused on eliminating the competition and making a profit. These interests
had also resulted in a degradation of infrastructure and a monopolized market. On the
contrary, a political interest that prioritizes cybersecurity can serve as an input to the
institutional framework influencing the process to develop and implement policies.
Likewise, a positive private interest could influence the institutional framework or
interorganizational collaboration to develop or adopt cybersecurity standards.
The institutional framework is limited to state governance including the EGovernment Act of 2004 and circulars covering high-level requirements without
adequate guidance. The participants reported that the policies are not well communicated,
nor readily accessible, and are not available in a format that presents changes and current
applicability. I confirmed these conditions during the literature review process. Federal
guidelines can provide the body of knowledge, frameworks, and standards to manage
cybersecurity. However, most participants expressed a lack of familiarity with federal
policies as the participants follow best practices and the comptroller’s guidance, which
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does not include federal or international standards. Kazemi et al. (2012) identified
complying with standards as a crucial factor for a successful security program.
The comptroller is responsible for performing IT audits, but these are done
infrequent manner and do not have a clear scope, plans, or metrics. The last audit was
done in 2016. Roesener et al. (2014) found that government agencies’ roles and
responsibilities are often overlapping and lacking the necessary authority. These results
are aligned with the situations of the CIO of Puerto Rico. The CIO has been deprecated
and reenacted in recent years. Reestablished in 2017, the CIO has focused on state
agencies instead of adopting a cross-government approach to develop solutions, foster
collaboration, and facilitate information sharing. Elements such as political interest can
influence the institutional framework to mandate cybersecurity standards and require
collaboration through policies. The policies can serve as the input driving the need for a
cross-government collaboration process.
According to the results of the study, collaboration with the federal, state, and
municipal governments was limited to emergency response or other compulsory
conditions, while collaboration with the private sector was limited to contractual
relationships. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) mentioned that government entities tend to act
independently failing to contemplate what is being done by others. Scholars agreed that
the government alone cannot secure cyberspace and needs the support and collaboration
of other sectors (Clinton, 2015; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Hua & Bapna, 2013; Miron &
Muita, 2014; Roesener et al., 2014).
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The participants acknowledged the importance of collaboration and shared their
willingness to collaborate, but most looked at the state government as the one responsible
for facilitating the conditions. Clinton (2015) identified policy as a vehicle to require
cross-sector collaboration, particularly to facilitate “a common understanding around
various risk management terms, methodologies, ideas, and language” (p. 67). One of the
participants agreed with Clinton regarding shared planning to perform benchmarking
with cross-sector organizations. The information shared in this dimension will serve as
input and feedback loop to influence the organizational structures and processes.
The capabilities to prevent and respond to cyberattacks are related to the
organization’s structures, resources, technologies, and policies. Armbruster et al. (2013)
discovered that the implementation of organizational processes is more challenging for
decentralized IT departments. Flores et al. (2013) also identified centralization as an
efficient structure. Participants in the current study confirmed these findings by
identifying centralization as the most effective structure to manage cybersecurity
resources and access controls. The people, their roles, and their responsibilities are also
essential parts of the organizational structure. Reece and Stahl (2015) stressed the need
for a managerial role such as the CISO to manage cybersecurity. The participants agreed
but shared that cybersecurity is managed as a secondary role instead of a primary
function. The lack of a cybersecurity manager was identified as a lesson learned from a
cyberattack against Hacienda (Minelli-Pérez, 2017). The participants associated the
absence of dedicated cybersecurity resources with the lack of personnel due to the fiscal
situation.
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Scholars agreed on the importance of understanding the organizational culture
(Flores et al., 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012). Participants in the current study mentioned that
the concept of cybersecurity is new and is not part of the culture, which leads to it often
being overlooked. According to Nugent and Collar (2015), organizational culture fails to
perceive cybersecurity professionals as heroes protecting the network. Some of the
participants described cybersecurity professionals as silent heroes who work to prevent
incidents. Participants also mentioned that cybersecurity professionals are often seen as
bad guys for restricting access as part of the security controls. Kazemi et al. (2012)
identified management support as one of the top seven factors to achieve a successful
information security program. Management recognition of cybersecurity professionals
can have a positive effect on job satisfaction and user awareness of cyber threats. Current
study participants agreed that management support is crucial to the assignment of
resources to support cybersecurity operations. Most participants shared having a good
experience with management while others reported challenges associated with their
understanding of security requirements and resources assignment.
The participants shared a vast experience of organizational processes aligned with
best practices such as the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Controls (see Figure 11) and
high-level federal standards such as FIPS 200 (see Table 2). The main processes in order
of relevance were related to contingency planning, System and information integrity,
access control, risk assessment, system and services acquisition, and configuration
management. The frequent exposure to hurricanes made contingency planning and
related subprocesses critical to municipal IT operations. Armbruster et al. (2013)
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explained that 71% of organizations who tested their contingency planning discovered
problems during the testing that could have happened during a real situation. Current
study participants identified testing as vital to the success of their contingency planning.
The participants also mentioned having alternate processing and storage sites, as well as
redundant telecommunication. System backup was identified as another crucial strategy
to recover from natural or humanmade incidents. On 2017, lack of proper system backup
caused Hacienda to lose 50 terabytes of data after an attack (Minelli-Pérez, 2017).

Inventory and Control of
Hardware Assets

Inventory and Control of
Software Assets

Continuous Vulnerability
Management

Controlled Use of
Administrative Privileges

Secure Configuration for
Hardware and Software
on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations
and Servers

Maintenance, Monitoring
and Analysis of Audit Logs

Email and Web Browser
Protections

Malware Defenses

Limitation and Control of
Network Ports, Protocols
and Services

Data Recovery Capabilities

Secure Configuration for
Network Devices, such as
Firewalls, Routers and
Switches

Boundary Defense

Data Protection

Implement a Security
Awareness and Training
Program

Application Software
Security

Not discussed as an
Information-Rich Case
Implemented by the
Municipalities

Incident Response and
Management

Penetration Tests and Red
Team Exercises

Figure 11. CIS controls best practices and local government posture. This figure shows the
relationship between cybersecurity best practiced and the practices followed by the municipalities
that participated in the study.

Participants and scholars agreed on the importance of system and information
integrity to perform vulnerability management and malicious code protection. The
participants shared using centralized antimalware solution and managing vulnerabilities
through a combination of manual and automated processes. Access control processes
were used for account management and to control access based on roles. The participants
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also acknowledged performing risk assessment such as vulnerability assessments and
penetration testing. Hua and Bapna (2013) mentioned the use of cost-effective
investments to improve resiliency. The participants are using system and services
acquisition to cover security requirements such as service support for their security tools
and leveraging the security capabilities of the providers. Configuration management is
used by the participants to limit and control configurations, ports, protocols, and services.
The information dimension serves as inputs and feedback loops to provide
awareness and role-based understanding to stimulate the culture, improve processes, and
empower management. Most participants use a combination of classroom, online, and
external training to support SETA programs. Adams and Makramalla (2015) shown that
80% of exploits are related to the human element. Participants identified end users as the
weakest link and recognized AT as a tool to promote awareness, strengthen commitment,
and change the culture. The participants recommended cost-effective alternative
including sending email, using experienced employees as facilitators, using a train the
trainer model, developing user manuals as part of system implementations that can be
used for training, using free tutorials, and leveraging professional associations. Douba et
al. (2014) affirmed that there is a relationship between digital literacy and cyber
resiliency. Therefore, it is crucial for technical staff to the benefit of CE in the form of
training, conferences, and networking to share methodologies and practices.
The priority of the participants providing services that are accessible, secure, and
efficient. Participants identified technology as the enabler to enforce access controls and
reduce the attack surface. Systems are considered more reliable than users who might
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forget what they were taught. Therefore, technology is used to enforce password policies,
including expiration, complexity, and history as well as to limit access to applications, the
Internet, and social media based on roles. Technology serves as the primary line of
defense to protect and defend from the threats of the general context as well as insider
threats. All of the participants confirmed the use of boundary and cryptographic
protection, including unified threat management, firewalls, IPS, IDS, antispam, and
traffic inspection. Scholars agreed that these technologies are essential to prevent and
respond to cyberattacks (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015).
Delimitations
The delimitations of the study consisted of exploring the local government
readiness to protect and defend information and systems within the San Juan – Carolina –
Caguas MSA. The scope of the study also included analyzing the influential factors to the
management of information resources and security controls. Patton (2002) described the
purpose of delimitation as a method to focus on data more relevant to the problem been
studied. For this reason, the sampling strategy excluded participants from less populated
municipalities and concentrated on public servants working in IT leadership roles within
the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA as information-rich cases. OST served as the
theoretical foundation to study the municipal posture as an open system influenced by its
interactions with the external environment. Additionally, the dimensions influencing
digital government was the conceptual framework used to identify the dimensions and
elements of the external environment affecting the municipal cybersecurity posture.
These delimitations helped to understand the different elements affecting the
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phenomenon to facilitate the development of strategies to improve the cybersecurity
resiliency of local government agencies.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the study were identified as the sampling strategy, the
dependability of the data, and the availability of the participants. The purposeful
sampling strategy concentrated in public servants in IT leadership roles within highly
populated municipalities. The strategy proved to be effective as the participants served as
information-rich cases. However, it would have been beneficial to include the perception
of IT leaders within not highly populated municipalities. Another limitation was not
collecting demographic information from the participants to preserve their
confidentiality. Not having this information prevented from performing correlations of
the results with factors such as the age or education of the participants.
Regarding the dependability of the data, there was limited literature about
cybersecurity at the local government level. Therefore, the literature was focused on
national and state government levels within the United States. The primary data related to
the local government was collected from interviews. The criterion sampling included at
least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon which proven to increase the
dependability of the data. The experience of the participants with the phenomenon and
their experience with the elements affecting their cybersecurity posture was crucial to the
study.
The availability of the participants had the strongest impact on the study. In late
September of 2017, a Category 5 hurricane devastated Puerto Rico. This situation
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increased the participant's experience in disaster recovery efforts but affected their
availability to participate in the study. The municipalities of Toa Baja and Toa Alta were
planned to be invited to participate, but due to the situation with the hurricane were
unreachable. Also due to availability constraints, 10 participants were interviewed, but
two of the eight interviews were done with two participants at the time where one
participant was the primary interviewee while the other played a supporting role. The
sample remained within the range of five to 25 participants as recommended by Creswell
(2013).
Recommendations
Several recommendations emerged from the execution of this study. The purpose
of these recommendations is to be used to further research on cybersecurity posture as a
phenomenon of inquiry. The recommendations are based on the strengths and limitations
of the study, including theory, scope, limitations, and methodology. The theoretical
foundation was OST which originated from the GST. Sher (2004) explained that GST
focuses on the arrangements, functions, and relationships among the elements of a
system. In addition to the relationships, Shafritz et al. (2015) considered the elements of a
system to include “inputs, processes, outputs, and feedback loops, and the environment”
(p. 340). These principles served as a strength to the outcome of the study as it facilitated
the understanding of the relationships and functions of the dimensions and elements
affecting cybersecurity. Therefore, OST is recommended for future studies.
The conceptual framework also demonstrated to be useful to study cybersecurity.
Since there was a significant knowledge gap about cybersecurity at the local government
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level, the dimensions influencing digital government was used to provide an
understanding of the different constructs that could affect the phenomenon. The
conceptual framework consisted of six dimensions, including general context,
institutional framework, interorganizational collaboration, organizational structures and
processes, information and data, and technology. It is recommended for further studies to
focus on individual dimensions or a set of related dimensions. Based on the data collected
from the participants and the literature review, further research related to the institutional
framework and organizational structures and processes could be beneficial to continue to
bridge the knowledge gap about this phenomenon.
The scope and delimitations of the study were justifiable and necessary to gain as
much knowledge as possible about cybersecurity at the local government. The research
design leveraged purposeful focused on IT leadership roles in highly populated
municipalities. The environment of these municipalities as expected increased the
participants' exposure and experience with the phenomenon allowing them to serve as
information-rich cases. According to the participants, their municipalities were perceived
to be more resilient than smaller municipalities and state agencies. Participant in IT
leadership roles should remain the unit of analysis. However, future studies should
include participants from less populated settings to understand their perception of the
cybersecurity posture and the elements affecting their posture. A similar approach could
be used to study state agencies, in particular, those responsible for critical services such
as Hacienda, OGP, Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and Puerto Rico Aqueducts and
Sewers Authority, among others.
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The sampling strategy included criterion sampling as a “predetermined criterion
of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). The criteria used in the study
included participants working in IT leadership role or performing related functions with
at least 2 years of experience working within highly populated municipalities. This
strategy was crucial to the dependability of the data. It is recommended to use a similar
criterion in further studies. One of the weaknesses of the study was that personnel
meeting this criterion have limited availability to participate in studies. The data
collection process consisted of in-person interviews with the purpose of having a more
direct interface with the participants to help foster confidence and collaboration to
provide as much data as possible. Future studies could use video conference technologies
to conduct the interviews or use a combination of video conference and in-person
interviews based on participants availability.
Creswell (2013) narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic, and
case study as the main qualitative research traditions. This study used a
phenomenological approach to understand the cybersecurity posture and influential its
elements as a multidimensional phenomenon from the lived experience of the
participants. Further research concentrated in a particular dimension could use a case
study approach. Creswell described the case study methodology as exploring a real-life
bounded system. For instance, a case study could be used to research state governance
within institutional framework dimension as it relates to the comptroller’s IT audit of
2016 in Puerto Rico as a bounded system while municipalities or state agencies could
serve as the unit of analysis for the study. Similarly, processes such as contingency
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planning within the organizational structures and processes dimension could be used to
study the impact of hurricane Maria in 2017 over state or local government IT operations.
Puerto Rico’s government and institutional framework resemble that of a U.S.
state. The U.S. states also share other elements of the general context such as economic
challenges and threats both human or natural. For instance, states like Florida, Louisiana,
Texas, and the Carolinas have been impacted by major hurricanes. Based on these
conditions, is also recommended conducting a replication or variation of this study in a
U.S. state to explore the cybersecurity posture of their local governments.
Implications
Implications to Social Change
The results of the study serve to raise awareness of cyberattacks as a social
problem affecting individuals and organizations. Advances in technology have led to
technical solutions capable of protecting against system-targeted attacked. Meanwhile,
user-targeted attacks continue to increase. Phishing emails are the most common attack
directed at individuals at their homes and workplaces with the intent to make the receiver
respond with sensitive information or executing a malicious payload such as ransomware.
The sensitive information is used to conduct identity theft or gaining access to financial
assets while ransomware encrypts all the data in the infected system and asks for a
ransom for the encryption key. Ransomware can spread into interconnected systems. If
the incident happened at a government agency, individual and families might not be able
to receive most needed services.
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Similarly, government operations can be affected by cyberattacks as well as
natural disaster. Both cases can result in social and economic injustice to individuals and
communities within the affected jurisdiction. In addition to raising awareness, the
implications of the research contribute to positive social change by providing advance
knowledge to support future investigations and by empowering individuals and
organizations with expert knowledge about the essential elements to support a resilient
cybersecurity posture. Increasing awareness on cyber threats and sharing an
understanding of the elements to manage their risks can lead individuals and
organizations to adopt an active role to improve their posture and support public safety.
Implications to Theory
The main methodological implication was the usefulness of the of the research
approach and its influence on the research design. Phenomenology was proven to be an
effective methodology to study cybersecurity as a social problem. Cybersecurity data at
an organizational level is protected from public release which difficult most quantitative
strategies. Other qualitative methodologies such as case study could have made the
participants hesitant to engage in the research as their organizations could be affected by
the results. However, phenomenology made available data significant to the problem
through the perception and lived experiences of the participants. This approach increased
the need to access information-rich cases which drove the purposeful criterion sampling
strategy. Phenomenology also led to the selection of face to face interviews with openended questions to establish a connection with the participants to allow them to share as
most information as possible.
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The theoretical implications included the application of OST and the dimensions
influencing digital government conceptual framework as the theoretical lenses to interpret
the findings. Dimensions influencing digital government divided the environment into six
dimensions. Within each dimension, different elements were identified. The conceptual
framework provided a deep understanding of the function of these elements and a brief
understanding of their relationship. OST was able to augment this understanding by
identifying the elements’ relationships and influence over one another as inputs,
processes, outputs, and feedback loops within the environment.
The contribution the body of knowledge is the most significant empirical
implications. Part of the purpose of this study was understanding the cybersecurity
posture of the local governments and identifying the factors influencing their posture with
the intent to bridge the knowledge gap about this phenomenon. Literature about the
phenomenon was limited to national and international settings. The results of this study
contributed to the body of knowledge by providing research-based data addressing gap
about cybersecurity at the local governments. The dimension and elements affecting
cybersecurity and their relationship were identified as part of the study. This empirical
data can serve as the foundation for future investigations.
Implications to Practice
The implications to practice are related to the findings discovered within the
elements of the dimensions influencing digital government. The implications can help to
provide awareness of the general context, tools to strengthen the institutional framework,
alternative for interorganizational collaboration, information resources, and technology
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management. The results of the study can also benefit the municipalities to leverage the
elements of the institutional framework, information and data, and technology
dimensions to improve organizational structures and processes.
From the general context, technological changes particular to the threat
environment were identified as the primary challenge. The U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (n.d.) manages the National Cyber Awareness System. This system
consists of five products including Alerts, Analysis Reports, Bulletins, Current Activity,
and Tips to inform the government, private sector, and the general population about cyber
threats and mitigations. IT staff, as well as nontechnical staff, can register to receive
notifications for the areas interest to maintain awareness on the threat environment.
Regarding positive or negative influence from elements such as the economy, politics,
and private interest can be managed with processes within the organizational structures
and processes dimension.
According to the results of the study, there is a significant gap in the institutional
framework. The Government of Puerto Rico can use existing federal governance as the
foundation to improve their current policies. For instance, the state government could use
FISMA of 2014 as a guiding source to update the E-Government Act of 2004. Similarly,
the Government of Puerto Rico could use OMB Circular A-130, Managing Federal
Information as a Strategic Resource to update or consolidate current circulars. The state
and municipal governments could use FIPS 200 to guide the development of uniform
minimum security requirements.
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According to the results of the study, the government security requirements and
the scope of the comptroller’s IT audit were not clear. The state government including the
comptroller and the CIO of Puerto Rico could adopt NIST SPs as guidelines to support
cybersecurity activities across the government. SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled
Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations could help to develop
minimum security requirements into manageable security controls. In the same way, the
comptroller could use SP 800-171A, Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled
Unclassified Information to develop clear audit scope, plans, and metrics.
Regarding standards and best practices, the participants identified that
municipalities follow best practices and limit the implementation of standards to those
required by the comptroller. Most standards could be expensive to implement, including
the cost to access their related information. However, NIST guidelines are free to the
public and are aligned with Committee for National Security Systems and international
standards such as “ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology–Security techniques–
Information security management systems–Requirements and ISO/IEC 15408,
Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security”
(Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2013, p. H-1). The Federal Trade
Commission offers free access to best practices endorsed by the government that is
available in English and Spanish (Federal Trade Commission, 2018). In the same way,
CIS offers community developed best practices with some of the documentation available
in English and Spanish (CIS, 2018). The resources in the institutional framework can be
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used by IT leaders and policymakers to raise awareness, develop, and implement detailed
policies in alignment with national and international cybersecurity practices.
The absence of collaboration was identified as an area of concern. Outside
compulsory conditions, no collaboration with the federal government was identified.
NICE is a federal program consisting of “a partnership between government, academia,
and the private sector focused on cybersecurity education, training, and workforce
development” (NIST, 2018, p. 1). NICE serves as a collaboration platform for local,
state, and federal governments. State and municipal government entities could join
NICE’ workgroups to benefit from the collaboration activities and start networking
efforts with other government entities. The state government could use the institutional
framework to buoy up interorganizational collaboration or appoint the CIO as the
responsible entity to establish a collaboration platform that includes the local
governments. Also, the municipal government could establish collaboration initiates with
neighboring municipalities, local academic institution, and the private sector.
The organizational structures and processes reflect the organizational posture by
using its structure, roles, and procedures to protect information and systems from the
challenges and threats of the general context, comply with the institutional framework,
and advance operation by using interorganizational collaboration, information, and
technology as feedback loops. For instance, information about the threat environment
such as the one provided by the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team can help
prepare to defend and protect the organizational against current threats as well as to gain
management support by justifying the need for technologies or personal to support
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cybersecurity operations. Economic situations such as the current fiscal crisis can be
detrimental to cybersecurity operation. However, long-term capital planning, centralized
procurement, contract negotiation, and Agile project approach can help to reduce cost and
improve the management of available resources.
The results of the study shown that cybersecurity is treated as a secondary role.
Cybersecurity is a complex domain composed of multiple operational processes related to
access control, configuration management, contingency planning, risk assessment, system
and services acquisition, and system and information integrity, among others. Failing to
have dedicated resources to make sure that the processed are defined, implemented, and
managed will have an adverse effect on the cybersecurity posture. In the absence of a
dedicated cybersecurity professional, the information and technology dimensions are
crucial to mitigate the situation. AT is crucial to raise awareness, change the culture, and
give the users the tools to help protect the organization from cyber threats. Municipalities
should include AT for every new user as well as yearly as a reminder to existing users.
The participants recommended that the central government develop and make available
the training to reduce duplicative effort and related cost.
Similar to AT, role-based training is fundamental to maintained technical staff up
to date, especially when the technical staff working with cybersecurity as a secondary
function. As recommended by the participants, CE should be part of the position
description and encourage by the employer. The municipalities could use online courses,
webinars, conference, formal courses, professional associations, and resources from the
interorganizational collaboration dimension to make sure the staff is well equipped with
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the information necessary to safeguard the organization through the management of
cybersecurity-related processes and technologies.
Technology is the central defense against threats and the mechanism to implement
access controls. Therefore, it is crucial for these tools to be properly configured. Security
technical implementation guides are the configuration standards developed by Defense
Information Systems Agency (n.d.) to harden against attacks. CIS offers similar guides
refer to as Benchmarks that can also be used to configure technologies securely (CIS,
2018). These guides are free to the public. Municipalities can leverage these guides to
configure their technologies to be resilient against cyberattacks.
Conclusions
Cyberspace is a new domain that policies have not been able to address with
success. Policies like FISMA of 2014 assign responsibilities to federal agencies, while
leaving state and local governments without a legal obligation and resources to protect
their information and systems while putting their operations and the wellbeing of their
constituents at risk. At the same times, advances in technology and constituents demand
continue to drive the implementation of online services. Kazemi et al. (2012) explained
that the increasing dependency on these technologies is reflected on the upsurge of cyber
threats.
In addition to increasing the exposure to cyber threats, the interconnectivity
within cyberspace increased the risk to compromise interconnected systems. Therefore,
the compromised of a municipal or state system could jeopardize the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of other interconnected municipal, state, or federal systems.
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Municipal governments use the same types of sensitive information as other government
entities. Municipalities also serve as first responders, critical infrastructure providers, and
are responsible for local economic development (Miron & Muita, 2014; Sylves, 2015).
Therefore, risks against their IT infrastructure can cause social and economic injustice to
the individuals and communities in their jurisdiction. It is critical that public servants
understand the factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of their agencies.
The results of this study contributed to the body of knowledge to bridge the gap
between in literature, theory, and practice. The results of the study provided information
on the challenges and strategies related to the cybersecurity posture of the local
government based on the perception of committed IT leaders who work to protect their
organizations from cyber incidents while delivering accessible, secure, and efficient
services to support the mission of their municipalities and their constituents. The outcome
of the study validated the applicability of the OST and the dimensions influencing digital
government as theoretical lenses to study the phenomenon while expanding the
conceptual frameworks to include additional elements affecting cybersecurity and their
relationships. The results of the study also provided research-based solutions to empower
practitioners with the knowledge to improve the different elements affecting
cybersecurity with the goal to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture.
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Appendix A: Cybersecurity Dimensions covered by TIGs
Policy

Summary

Development and
Maintenance of
Government Websites
(Policy TIG-002)

Make agencies responsible for developing and maintaining
websites to provide a virtual alternative to access information
and services. The policy requires the development of policies
and procedures for the operation and maintenance of websites
in compliance with the TIG-003. The policy includes audits for
the evaluation of the content, design, and usability, but not for
security control.
Provides guidelines for the technology services offered by the
OGP, as well as to understand the conditions and
responsibilities for the services. Services such as training,
licensing, firewall, email, antivirus, and consulting are not
directly available to municipalities.
Outlines responsibilities and requirements regarding the
development, implementation, and publication of online
services. The policy requires encryption for the communication
and exchange confidential information. The policy indicated the
use of Secure Sockets Layer protocol but does not specify
which version.
Note: Most SSL have been deprecated by the Internet
Engineering Task Force RFC 6176 and 7568.

Technology Services
(Policy TIG-004)

Development,
Integration, and
Publication of
Governmental
Electronic
Transactions (Policy
TIG-006)

Dimension and EGovernment Goals
General Context:
• Increase citizen
participation
• Improve services
• Ensure socially
inclusiveness
Organizational Structure
and Processes:
• Reduce costs and
burdens
• Improve services
General Context:
• Increase citizen
participation
• Improve services
• Reduce costs and
burdens
• Ensure socially
inclusiveness
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Policy

Summary

Disposition of
Equipment and
Licenses (Policy TIG007)

Describes the mechanisms to ensure that agencies properly
dispose of IT hardware and software. The agencies are
responsible for deciding the best method (overwriting or
degaussing) to remove information, but there is not mentioned
of related standards or best practices. The policy permits the
transfer of obsolete equipment to other agencies. The policy
does mention that equipment cannot be transferred due to
security reasons but does not specify the reasons. Further, there
is no mentioned of audits to validate compliance with the
policy.
Note: Obsolete technology can introduce vulnerabilities,
especially as they may no longer be supported by the vendors.
Defines the acceptable use of information handled through
information systems, Internet technologies, and email to protect
end users and the government from cyber incidents. The policy
provides guidance without referencing standards.
Requires government entities to implement payroll, finance,
and human resources systems providing interoperability and
integration with the Hacienda.

Use of Information
Systems, the Internet,
and E-Mail (Policy
TIG-008)
Integration of
Financial Systems
(Policy TIG-009)

Dimension and EGovernment Goals
Organizational Structure
and Processes:
• Reduce costs and
burdens
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability

Information and Data:
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability
Interorganizational
Collaboration and
Networks:
• Promote interagency
collaboration
• Reduce costs and
burdens
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Policy

Summary

Dimension and EGovernment Goals
Acquisition of
Specifies the minimum standards all procurement of IT
Organizational Structure
Equipment for
equipment must follow to ensure that it supports the eand Processes:
Automated
government. The policy provides broad requirements, including • Promote interagency
Information Systems • Capability to integrate with the government systems
collaboration
(Policy TIG-010)
• Comply with the standards and requirements for acquisition • Reduce costs and
burdens
• Meet the minimum capacity requirements and quality
assurance
• Support procurement
• Comply with the TIG-003 security requirements
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability
Technology
Establishes best practices to acquire and implement IT
Technology:
Infrastructure Best
infrastructure components, including platforms, software,
• Reduce costs and
Practices (Policy
networks, and data. There is no reference to industry standards
burdens
TIG-011)
other than the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
• Support procurement
Mandate agencies to establish methodologies to ensure the
• Protecting privacy,
integrity, reliability, deduplication, and confidentiality of the
security, and
data, but those not provide guidance.
availability
Government
This policy establishes practices that every agency within the
Organizational Structure
Technology
executive branch must follow to purchase technology goods and and Processes:
Procurement
services.
• Reduce costs and
Reference Framework
burdens
(Policy TIG-013)
• Support procurement
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability

169
Policy

Summary

Continuity of
Government Program
(Policy TIG-015)

Provides guidelines to establish programs to ensure operational
continuity of critical government functions. The policy requires
the use of tools and plans such as risk analysis, business impact
analysis, disaster recovery plan, business continuity plan,
incident management, emergency management, training, and
test programs, among others. The policy follows the Disaster
Recovery Institute International guidelines and practices. There
is no mention of funding to accomplish these tasks. Other
standards such as NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1, Contingency
Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems could be more
cost-effective.
Requires database projects to have a plan to interconnect with
other agencies, including a process for defining policies,
analyzing jurisdictions, validating security compliance,
reviewing data classification, determining third party’s
interactions, and creating public policy on the particular
programs and integration points.
Requires compliance with privacy laws at the state and federal
level but does not identify the laws. It also requires compliance
with other TIGs such as TIG-003, TIG-017, and TIG-019.

Application
Programming
Interface - API
(Policy TIG-016)

Dimension and EGovernment Goals
Technology:
• Improve services
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability

Interorganizational
Collaboration and
Networks:
• Promote interagency
collaboration
• Improve services
• Reduce costs and
burdens
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability
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Policy
Data Classification
and Security
Categorization
(Policy TIG-019).

Summary
The policy is divided into two areas. The first area provides
guidance for determining the sensitivity of data to establish its
proper classification and categorization. The second area relates
to the protective measures to safeguard sensitive data. This
policy takes advantage of federal standards and guidance.
• Defines accountable roles (data owner, system owner, etc.)
aligned with NIST guidelines.
• Requires the use of FIPS 199, Standards for Security
Categorization of Federal Information and Information
Systems as the standard to determine security categorization.
• Provide detailed guidance to secure information on physical
(limited and authorized access), transit (Requires FIPS 1402, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
compatible encryption), and storage contexts.
• Requires the disposition of equipment and media to be
sanitized in accordance with NIST Special Publication 80088, Guidelines for Media Sanitization.

Dimension and EGovernment Goals
Information and Data:
• Protecting privacy,
security, and
availability
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Date:
Place:
Interviewer:
Interviewee: Pseudonyms. The identity of the participant will be confidential.
Two or more years of experience related to cybersecurity at the local government level:
Questions
1. How do you perceive the cybersecurity
posture of local government
municipalities in Puerto Rico in
comparison with state and federal
agencies?
2. What is your organization doing to
safeguard their information resources
from cyber threats and do you consider
it to be sufficient?
3. What factors do you consider are most
influential to achieve a resilient
cybersecurity posture in municipalities
within Puerto Rico?
4. Described how these factors
interconnect and their sequence or
priority order.
5. What do you think are the main
challenges affecting these factors?
6. What strategies do you recommend
mitigating these challenges and
improve the cybersecurity posture?
7. What is your perception of federal and
state information security policy
governing cybersecurity?
8. What do you foresee for the role of
interorganizational collaboration in
cybersecurity?

Notes
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Questions
9. What do you consider to be key
cybersecurity related processes that
need to be in place to achieve a
resilient cybersecurity posture?
10. What organizational structure do you
find to be more efficient for
cybersecurity management and why?
11. How engaged are the public servants in
your organization with cybersecurity
and what are your recommendations to
improve or sustain their level of
engagement?
12. In your experience, what are the main
challenges and benefits of technology
solutions to support cybersecurity
operations?
13. Anything you would like to add to this
interview?

Notes

